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ABSTRACT

PRIVACY-AWARE COLLABORATION
AMONG UNTRUSTED
RESOURCE CONSTRAINED DEVICES
FEBRUARY 2013
ANDRES DAVID MOLINA-MARKHAM
B.S., UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL AUTÓNOMA DE MÉXICO
M.S., UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL AUTÓNOMA DE MÉXICO
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Kevin Fu

Individuals are increasingly encouraged to share private information with service
providers. Privacy is relaxed to increase the utility of the data for the provider. This
dissertation offers an alternative approach in which raw data stay with individuals
and only coarse aggregates are sent to analysts. A challenge is the reliance on constrained devices for data collection. This dissertation demonstrates the practicality
of this approach by designing and implementing privacy-aware systems that collect
information using low-cost or ultra-low-power microcontrollers. Smart meters can
generate certified readings suitable for use in a privacy-preserving system every 10 s
using a Texas Instruments MSP430 microcontroller. CRFIDs—batteryless devices
viii

that operate on harvested energy from RF—can generate encrypted sub-aggregates
in 17 s to contribute to a privacy-preserving aggregation system that does not rely on
a trusted aggregator. A secure communication channel for CRFID tags via untrusted
relays achieves a throughput of 18 Kbps.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This dissertation proposes a model for privacy-aware data collection systems that
rely on embedded devices with low-cost or ultra-low-power microcontroller units. In
these systems data remain with individuals who generate the data. Coarse grained
aggregates are provided to analysts or service providers.
Common practice in data collection relies on sending raw data to a trusted aggregator, which analyzes and stores them. Individuals whose data are being collected
have to trust this aggregator to protect their data from others and to respect their privacy by not analyzing the data beyond what is needed to provide a service. Another
limitation of this model from the privacy standpoint is that once the information from
an individual has been leaked, the individual no longer has control over its use.
The approach in this dissertation challenges current methods by removing the
requirement of a trusted aggregator and by demonstrating feasibility on constrained
devices.1 It demonstrates that privacy-preserving techniques can be practically implemented using constrained devices such as those that depend on low-cost or ultralow-power microcontrollers. Research over the last couple of years has converged
in providing a more formal framework for quantifying privacy [49] and in developing

1

For the purposes of this dissertation, a constrained device is an embedded system that relies on
an ultra-low-power or low-cost microcontroller unit. In 2012 low-cost microcontrollers range in price
from $0.25 to $9.00 USD Ultra-low-power microcontrollers consume under 1mW/MHz. For example,
the Texas Instruments MSP430F2618 can consume as little as 803 µW/MHz; the ARM Cortex-M0+
as little as 11.2 µW/MHz; and the ARM Cortex-M0 as little as 16 µW/MHz. Microcontrollers in
this class typically operate at a frequency of around 25 MHz and utilize 32-bit, 16-bit, or 8-bit
architectures. MCUs can go as high as 100 MHz.

1

cryptographic techniques to support privacy-aware aggregation [140, 33, 37, 145]. The
feasibility of the approach in this dissertation draws from these recent developments,
providing a basis for closing the gap between theory and implementation.
The issue of privacy in data collection is increasingly critical with the spread of
embedded systems that collect personal data. One example is the worldwide deployment of smart meters—76 million as of 2010 [116]. In the U.S. alone, over 36 million
smart meters have been installed as of 2012, with 675,000 being installed monthly. It
is estimated that by 2015 there will be 65 million [79] in the U.S. These smart meters rely on low-cost microcontrollers. Technological trends suggest that constrained
devices will continue to be involved in data collection applications for a long time.
One reason is that battery technologies and energy efficiency are not evolving at the
same rate as the proliferation of data collection applications. Also, a new class of
batteryless devices offers a promising solution for long-term and low-maintenance deployments [24]; these devices will continue to be subject to severe power constraints.
The successful implementation of the model presented here would allow individuals to gain control over their data. Systems for collection of private data could
be implemented following a principle similar to the least privilege principle in security [134]: detailed data would not be shared, unless it were strictly necessary to
receive a service. Future uses of previously collected data by utilities would be more
difficult. For example, finding out that utility metering using measurements every
second reveals sensitive information would not be an issue if data had remained with
the consumer and a utility had only received the total dollar amount owed.

1.1

Thesis Statement

The work in this dissertation provides evidence to support the following thesis:
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A model for performing distributed privacy-preserving computations without relying on trusted aggregators can be practically implemented on embedded systems that
rely on low-cost or ultra-low-power microcontrollers.
A careful combination of cryptographic techniques and distributed system techniques may enable ubiquitous data collection of private information, such that individuals achieve adequate privacy guarantees and analysts obtain information with
adequate utility. This dissertation challenges the idea that the best model for dealing
with embedded constrained devices that collect or generate data is one in which devices pass data verbatim onto a more powerful system for aggregation and analysis.
While this sink model may offer many benefits, such as increased storage and computational capabilities, it may not always be the most appropriate for implementing
privacy-aware applications.

1.2

Contributions

The validity of the thesis is demonstrated by implementing each of the following
systems:
1. Privacy-preserving smart metering with low cost microcontrollers
2. RFID-scale device communication via untrusted relays
3. Privacy-preserving aggregation with RFID-scale devices
This dissertation argues for the potential generalization of these systems to other
applications and suggests research directions. It also identifies limitations of the
approach, such as providing fault tolerance in aggregations and performing complex
analyses with high utility.
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1.3

Privacy-Preserving Smart Metering

A solution to the privacy issue of smart metering relies on the use of ZeroKnowledge Proof (ZKP) systems to compute billing and other aggregates from a
power trace [108, 126]. However, current smart meters are implemented using lowcost microcontrollers such as the Texas Instruments MSP430, which has severe computational, storage, and memory limitations.
An approach for the implementation of these ZKP systems in constrained devices
utilizes specific elliptic curve based primitives, which minimize the computational
and memory footprints in a given microcontroller. The practicality of these systems
is evaluated by determining the extent to which a ZKP system could be deployed
on current smart meters and by measuring the performance that should be expected
using newly developing microcontroller and RAM technologies.
A prototype meter equipped with a microcontroller like those in current smart
meters is capable of producing certified readings for ZKP systems every 28 seconds.
If a newer $3.30 USD MSP430 microcontroller is used, readings can be produced
every 10 seconds.

1.4

RFID-Scale Device Communication via Untrusted Relays

Computational RFID tags have evolved from traditional supply-chain RFID tags,
adding a general purpose microcontroller and sensors, which make them well-suited
platforms for developing networks of batteryless nodes. However, the abstractions
provided by current RFID communication are not well suited for CRFIDs. The
current RFID standard of communication treats tags as external memory locations for
reading or writing data. This severely limits the networking capabilities of CRFIDs.
Backscatter Anything-to-Tag (BAT) communication provides an alternative approach for networking this class of devices. In this networking stack, tags can send
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and receive packets from tags or other computer systems via untrusted relays. These
relays provide power and communication for these more capable tags. In order to provide secrecy and integrity to communication, BAT encrypts the payload and utilizes
cryptographic message authentication codes (MACs).
The practicality of BAT is evaluated through measuring the throughput and cryptographic overhead of a prototype implementation using the UMass Moo [148], a current CRFID prototype, and software radio. The maximum throughput observed was
18 Kbps and data can be encrypted at a rate of 61 Kbps.

1.5

Privacy-Preserving Aggregation with RFID-Scale Devices

CRFIDs are an ideal platform for developing distributed applications to collect
data such as the monitoring of infrastructures. In some cases it is important to
allow an untrusted party to obtain an aggregate from data obtained from multiple
devices such that individual entries are not revealed in the process. A solution to
this problem relies on the distributed calculation of a perturbed answer to provide
distributed differential privacy. However, CRFIDs are highly constrained devices that
have variable power and limited RAM and computational capabilities.
Shi et al. [140] and Chan et al. [33] propose systems in which a group of individuals collectively generate a noisy aggregate to achieve privacy. The supporting
cryptographic computation that each individual device needs to perform is implemented and measured on the UMass Moo. The feasibility of these approaches is
evaluated based on the time it takes for a CRFID to contribute to the computation
of these noisy aggregates. A Moo needs to make a 17 s computation to contribute to
this aggregate. However, if fault tolerance is implemented, a Moo needs to perform
a 2-minute calculation when 100 other devices are involved or a 4-minute calculation
when 10,000 other devices are involved.

6

1.6

Organization

Chapter 2 provides general background and definitions regarding a system model
for data collection using constrained devices. Chapters 3-6 develop the main contributions of this dissertation. Chapter 3 demonstrates the need for providing privacy
in utility metering, and Chapter 4 evaluates the feasibility of implementing privacypreserving meters on low-cost microcontrollers. Chapter 5 describes a networking
stack for RFID-scale devices, and Chapter 6 discusses the practicality of implementing a privacy-preserving system for computing aggregates with RFID-scale devices.
Chapter 7 explores the implications of implementing similar privacy-preserving systems for medical devices that collect medical telemetry with potentially sensitive
information. Finally, Chapter 8 lists research problems for future work.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS

This chapter provides background and definitions needed to understand the privacypreserving model presented in this dissertation, as well as the techniques to provide
privacy in this context. It begins with a description of constrained embedded systems
and the data collection model. The privacy-preserving building blocks discussed are
zero-knowledge proof systems, distributed differential privacy, and secrecy and integrity for networking.

2.1

Constrained Embedded Systems

Embedded systems are systems that are designed to perform only a handful of
specific tasks. For example, an electric smart meter is an embedded system designed
to measure the electric load on a home at fixed intervals of time, record these measurements, and display them or transmit them via a wireless channel. A smart meter
is not designed to implement arbitrary functionality or functionality that changes
often.
The techniques in this dissertation are relevant for embedded systems that are implemented using either low-cost microcontrollers or ultra-low-power microcontrollers.
At the time of writing, low-cost microcontrollers are priced below $9.00 USD, and
ultra-low-power microcontrollers consume under 1 mW/MHz. There are a wide range
of microcontrollers that fit into this category with 8, 16 or 32-bit architectures and
that run at a variety of clock speeds from 4-100 MHz. The Texas Instruments MSP430
(16-bit architecture, 4 MHz-25 MHz frequencies) [1], the ARM Cortex-M3 (32-bit
8

architecture, 20 MHz-100 MHz frequencies) [130], the ARM Cortex-M0 (32-bit architecture, 30 MHz-50 MHz frequencies) [2], and the ARM Cortex M0+ (32-bit architecture, 32 MHz-48 MHz frequencies) [7] are common platforms. Not all embedded
systems fall into this category. Automotive, medical, or military applications may be
implemented using high-performance microprocessors that cost up to $200 USD or
include multicore processors [4].

2.2

Distributed Model for Data Collection and Analysis

This dissertation is concerned with the problem of computing a function on data
that is generated by multiple individuals that do not necessarily trust each other with
their data. Further, individuals may also not fully trust any third party to compute
this function in a centralized fashion, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. This dissertation
will primarily restrict its attention to devices that have computational, power or cost
constraints. For simplicity, this work assumes that all the devices considered in a
single application store their data with a compatible schema—for example, recording
data about a time series.
The term privacy-preserving will be used in two different ways in this dissertation,
depending on the application. The first will apply in the context of utility metering
and the second in the context of aggregation across multiple individuals.
In utility metering, it is important that a function such as the calculation of a bill
on an individual’s usage reflect the exact monetary amount due, but hide the details
of how that individual actually spent the billed resource. In other applications, a
function is calculated using data from multiple individuals; such as calculating the
number of medical devices that have experienced a malfunction in a given device
population. In this case, a desired notion of privacy may be that the result of the
calculation not reveal whether or not a particular device’s input was included in the
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calculation. This concept of privacy will help in quantifying the extent to which an
adversary may learn the actual input from any particular device.
The following sections discuss these two notions of privacy as well as some general
techniques for achieving them. Specifically, Zero-Knowledge Proof systems (§2.3)—
originally introduced by Goldwasser et al. [68]— provide a general cryptographic
technique that would allow a party to disclose the output of a function to another
untrusted party without disclosing additional information, such as the data inputs to
the function. In the process, the party that receives the output of the function obtains
proof with strong guarantees that the function was correctly computed. Differential
privacy (§2.4), originally introduced by Dwork et al. [51, 43, 52] provides a clean
framework for quantifying privacy. This dissertation is concerned with ways to achieve
this notion of privacy in a distributed setting. Distributed techniques to achieve
differential privacy were first introduced by Dwork et al. [50] and shortly thereafter
developed by others, including Rastogi et al. [123], Shi et al. [140] and Chen et al. [37].
The broader term privacy-aware is used to describe system aspects that contribute
to the goal of preventing information disclosure. For example, the networking stack
BAT (Chapter 5), provides secrecy and integrity, and while these properties themselves do not preserve privacy per se, this secure channel plays an important role in
implementing a privacy-preserving system.

2.3

Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems

Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) systems [69] were originally developed as challengeresponse protocols that allow a prover to demonstrate the knowledge of a secret to a
verifier, without revealing any partial information that would help the verifier infer
the secret, other than the fact that the prover knows the secret. These protocols
relied on interactive verifications in which the verifier presents a series of challenges
to the prover that can easily be responded to when the prover knows the secret,
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but are extremely difficult to respond to reliably without knowledge of the secret;
as the number of consecutive challenges increases, the probability of answering these
challenges without knowing the secret decreases exponentially. Zero-Knowledge Proof
Systems can be made non-interactive, for example by using the well known FiatShamir heuristic [59].
Chapter 4 builds on ZKP systems to implement a privacy-preserving billing scheme
with time-of-use based tariffs for smart electricity metering making use of commitments and Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signatures. In that setting, a customer fitted with
a smart meter proves to a utility provider the amount to be paid for their electricity
consumption within a specific time period, without revealing any details about their
fine-grained consumption. The bill is calculated on the basis of detailed readings,
every half hour or fifteen minutes, that are each billed according to the dynamic price
of electricity at that time, or a pre-defined but time variable tariff scheme. These
protocols are applicable when consumers do not trust the utility with their detailed
electricity usage information, and the utility does not rely on consumers to honestly
report their usage.

2.3.1

Cryptographic Commitments

Commitment schemes are cryptographic primitives that enable a party to create
the digital equivalent of an envelope for a secret. Commitments support two important properties: hiding protects the secrecy of the committed message, and binding
ensures it can only be opened to the committed message.
Pedersen commitments [120] are information-theoretically hiding and binding under the discrete logarithm assumption. They rely on a set of global parameters,
namely a group G of prime order p with generators g and h. Under that scheme a
commitment C to message r ∈ Zp is computed as C = g r ho where o is an opening
nonce chosen uniformly at random in Zp . Opening a commitment C involves disclos-
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ing the values r and o to a verifier. In addition to opening the commitment, efficient
protocols exist for a prover to convince a verifier that they know the committed value
without disclosing it.
Fujisaki-Okamoto commitments [61] are similar to Pedersen commitments, except
that they make use of a group of composite, hidden order instead of a group of prime
order. They allow the committed value to be any integer, including negative integers.
Pedersen or Fujisaki-Okamoto commitments can be used depending on whether a
device needs to encode negative values or not.

2.3.2

Camenisch-Lysyanskaya Signatures

Digital signatures allow a party to show the authenticity or integrity of a message
or document. Different signature schemes may be used to achieve different security properties. A standard signature scheme, such as DSA, can be used to ensure
the integrity of any further statement proved on the basis of previous measurements
(e.g. meter readings). When a device is not trusted, a signature scheme such as
Camenisch-Lysyanskaya (CL) signatures [28] can be used to sign messages or documents individually. For example in the case of time-of-use billing, a meter periodically
commits to meter readings. Those commitments are signed and the customer can use
the signature to prove functions of the bill to a verifier.
CL-signatures allow a requesting party to obtain a digital signature on a commitment from an authorized signer. In particular, Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [28] provide efficient protocols for computing a signature on a commitment message, as well
as for constructing zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge of a signature on a committed
or encrypted message. Note that there are two digital signature schemes attributed
to Camenisch and Lysyanskaya; their earlier scheme [27] relies on the Strong RSA
assumption, while the later scheme relies on a discrete-logarithm-based assumption
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(the LRSW assumption) [99]. CL-signatures [28] can be implemented using elliptic
curve groups, as long as there is an efficient bilinear map that is non-degenerate.
We describe the key generation function, the signing function and the signature
verification function for CL-signatures using the notation in [129]:
1. CLKeyGen(1k ). Given a security parameter k, and the number of block messages to sign n, the signer generates the first part of their public key: (p, G, H, g, h, e),
such that there is a mapping e : G × G → H, which is bilinear, non-degenerate
and efficient to compute. The signer then chooses the following parameters for
their private key: x, y, z1 , . . . , zn ∈R Zp . Next, the signer uses these parameters
to compute X = g x , Y = g y and Zi = g zi for all i ∈ [1, n]. The public key is
pubkey = (p, G, H, g, h, e, X, Y, {Zi }, {Wi }), and the secret key is the public key
concatenated with (x, y, {zi }).
2. CLSign((x, y, {zi }), {mi }). To sign n blocks {mi }, the signer first chooses a ∈R
G, and computes b = ay . The signer then computes Ai = azi and Bi = (Ai )y
Q
i
. The
for all i ∈ [2, n]. Finally, the signer computes σ = ax+xym1 ni=2 Axym
i
signature is sig = (a, {Ai }, b, {Bi }, σ).

3. CLV erif ySign(pubkey, {mi }, sig). The verifier performs the following computations and outputs accept if the following equalities hold: e(a, Y ) = e(g, b);
e(a, Zi ) = e(g, Ai ), ∀i ∈ [1, n]; e(Ai , Y ) = e(g, Bi ), ∀i ∈ [1, n]; and e(g, σ) =
Q
e(X, a) · e(X, b)m1 · ni=2 e(X, Bi )mi .

2.4

Distributed Differential Privacy

Rastogi et al. [124] classify the mechanisms to provide privacy to databases depending on where they are implemented in the lifecycle of the data, from the point
the data is collected to the point some data is presented to an analyst. This classification is illustrated in Figure 2.2. The data can be subject to local perturbation where
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individuals trust no one but themselves; alternatively in data publishing, data can
be aggregated by a trusted entity which then transforms the dataset into a different
dataset in a way that it preserves some characteristics of the original dataset while
providing privacy to individuals. Finally, data may be aggregated by a trusted entity
and analysts are only allowed to perform queries. A query processor will compute
the correct answer to the query and will add noise to it according to the sensitivity
of the query.
This last mechanism, known as output perturbation, allows for the implementation
of querying systems that provide differential privacy. This notion of privacy, originally
introduced by Dwork et al. [51, 43, 52] provides a clean definition that allows for the
quantification of loss of privacy in statistical databases in a way that is independent
of the additional information that an adversary may possess.
a. Local
Perturbation
b. Data
Publishing
Individuals

...

Trusted
Aggregator

c. Output
Perturbation
Query
Processor

Analyst

Figure 2.2. Techniques to provide privacy, implemented at different times in the
lifecycle of the data, from the point the data is collected to the point some data is
presented to an analyst

2.4.1

Differential Privacy with a Trusted Aggregator

Differential privacy is a concept originally developed in the context of statistical
databases, which can be thought of as a way to prevent a query—from an analyst
that does not have direct access to the database— from revealing whether or not
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a particular record was used in the computation of the answer to that query. One
way of providing answers to queries to satisfy this notion of privacy is via an output
perturbation mechanism as illustrated in Figure 2.2.
A formal definition of this notion is below, as well as a description of a general
technique for achieving it. Related work provides ways to eliminate the requirement
of a trusted aggregator (§2.4.2).
Formally, a computation F on a set of datasets D provides (ε, δ)-differential privacy if for each pair of datasets D1 , D2 ∈ D that differ by at most one record and for
all the outputs in S ⊂ Range(F), the following inequality is satisfied:

P r[F(D1 ) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε) · P r[F(D2 ) ∈ S] + δ

Intuitively, this means that the output of the computation is independent of the
inclusion of a particular record, for most records. The parameter ε provides a way
to trade privacy with accuracy, and the parameter δ provides a way to relax the
condition for which achieving (ε, 0) is difficult.
A general mechanism for providing differential privacy to certain kinds of queries
on a dataset is to allow a trusted aggregator to first compute an exact answer to a
query and then add noise drawn from a Laplace or Geometric distribution according
to the sensitivity of the query. As some research has pointed out, it is possible to
combine this approach with a cryptographic solution in order to eliminate the need
for a trusted aggregator. Logically, this is illustrated by Figure 2.3.
2.4.2

Differential Privacy with an Untrusted Aggregator

Several authors have provided cryptographic solutions to eliminate the need for
a trusted aggregator in the process of adding noise after an exact answer to a query
has been calculated [50, 123, 140, 37]. The general idea behind these approaches
is to allow participants to collectively generate the noise to be added to the answer
16

while providing partial sub aggregates for that query that when combined output the
answer to the query.

Individual
Device
2
Individual
Device
3

Individual
Device
1

Function
of
Data

Untrusted
Aggregator

Query
Processor

Analyst

Individual
Device
4

...
Individual
Device
n-1

Individual
Device
n

Figure 2.3. Slight modification to the general collaboration model in which a device
or entity may be selected to aggregate without being trusted.

For example, it is known that with the use of homomorphic encryption, a set
of parties can compute an exact counting query in such a way that each participant
provides an encrypted subtotal to the counting query; adding the encrypted subtotals
will give the ciphertext corresponding to the total counting query. Thus, decrypting
this value would allow for the computation of the total without revealing the individual contributions. Of course, this does not provide differential privacy. However,
if instead of asking that each individual return an exact subtotal, each returned a
subtotal plus a small amount of noise, such that the total noise added is drawn from
a Geometric distribution, then the final answer will be the actual answer to the query
plus some noise, just as when a trusted aggregator is used. In this case however, the
individual parts are not revealed until all the contributions are combined.
Actual solutions proposed in the literature are more complex in order to provide
fault tolerance [33] or improve scalability and practicality [37]. Another system that
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uses a distributed approach of a sort is GUPT [104], however, the main purpose of
this system is to maximize the utility of a computation.

2.5

Secrecy and Integrity for Networking

A communication channel that provides secrecy and integrity is an important component for creating a distributed system for privacy-aware collaboration. Throughout
this dissertation, it will be required that data from each individual device travels encrypted from one place to another to ensure that eavesdroppers are not able to infer
the values that each reports during the computation of an aggregate. Also, some applications may require an additional mechanism to ensure that data is not tampered
with during travel and that messages come from a verifiable location. This last feature does not necessarily compromise privacy because one may be able to verify that
a given message came from a particular individual, without seeing what it contains,
e.g. because the payload of the message is encrypted.
We should note that security analyses typically concern confidentiality, integrity,
and availability [20]. However, this dissertation is not primarily focused on ensuring
availability because the devices in question—particularly the RFID-scale devices—
are such that it is relatively simple to jam a channel so that a device can no longer
communicate. Thus, that problem is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

2.5.1

Symmetric Key Primitives

When a pair of individuals share a symmetric key, they can typically communicate more efficiently because the functions to encrypt and decrypt are faster than
their public key counterparts. In fact, the implementations described in Chapters 4
and 5 both use the AES symmetric block cipher to encrypt and decrypt data because
software implementations are fast, and some low-cost and ultra-low-power microcontrollers implement this cipher in hardware. However, as will be more explicit

18

in each of the applications described in this dissertation, the successful utilization
of this block cipher requires that two parties share a key. In that case, keys can
be generated by utilizing key agreements such as the Diffie-Hellman key exchange
or an identity-based encryption key agreement scheme, for example. The latter offers some attractive benefits, including the possibility of generating shared keys in a
non-interactive fashion (§2.5.3).

2.5.2

Public Key Primitives

Identity-Based Encryption provides a useful technique that simplifies the task of
computing pairwise keys to allow devices to establish encrypted pairwise communication links with other devices. Devices may compute these pairwise keys on demand
without needing to know potential recipients beforehand. In principle, a device may
not know how many other devices are or will be in a network—or even which devices
it will need to communicate with in the future.
An approach with pre-shared encryption keys has several limitations, such as key
revocation, key expiration and an inability to specify recipients. Therefore a public
key encryption scheme is highly desirable in this setting. Identity-based key exchange
offers several advantages over more traditional key exchange methods, like the DiffieHellman key exchange. For instance, the Diffie-Hellman key exchange is particularly
vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks, unless a third party authenticates protocol
participants. This limitation is usually addressed by the addition of a Certificate
Authority (CA), but key-management is difficult in CA-based systems [58].

2.5.3

Identity-Based Encryption

Identity-based key agreement schemes allow for the creation of private key/public
key pairs, such that the public key is any string and the corresponding private key
can only be granted by a trusted entity—a private-key generator (PKG). Thus, for
example, it would be easy for a device to encrypt a message so that only another
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device with serial number x could obtain the corresponding decrypting private key
from the PKG. Additionally, the sender device may be able to append an expiration
to the public key.
Sakai, Ohgishi and Kasahara [132] proposed a non-interactive identity-based key
exchange protocol similar in spirit to the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. However, Sakai, Ohgishi and Kasahara use a pairing on an elliptic curve. A symmetric
pairing is a non-degenerate bilinear map e : G × G → GT that takes two elements
from a cyclic elliptic curve group G and returns an element in another group GT .
The bilinear property implies that

e(P1 + P2 , Q) = e(P1 , Q) · e(P2 , Q)

and
e(P, Q1 + Q2 ) = e(P, Q1 ) · e(P, Q2 ),
for all elements of G. Also, e(aP, Q) = e(P, aQ) = e(P, Q)a .
Thus, given the symmetric pairing e as above, where G = hP i, and two hash
functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G; H2 : GT → {0, 1}n , the setup, key extraction and
key agreement functions for the Sakai, Ohgishi and Kasahara key exchange can be
described as follows:
Setup: A private-key generator (PKG) chooses a secret master key s uniformly
at random from Zp ; and sets R = sP as the public key together with the public
parameters, including H1 and H2 .
Key extraction: The PKG will compute the private key of a device A as dA =
sQA , where QA is a hash of A’s id QA = H1 (idA ).
Key agreement: Two devices A and B would create a shared key if they
know each other’s identity strings idA and idB . That is, A would compute KA =
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H2 (e(dA , QB )) and B would compute KB = H2 (e(dB , QA )). Note that KA = KB
because
H2 (e(dA , QB )) = H2 (e(sQA , QB ))
and
H2 (e(sQA , QB )) = H2 (e(QA , QB )s );
similarly,
H2 (e(dB , QA )) = H2 (e(QB , QA )s ).
Therefore the equality KA = KB follows directly from the symmetry of e.
This identity-based key exchange offers a simple way of generating shared keys
in a non-interactive manner without the need of a certification authority. There
are more efficient pairing based key agreements—some of them trading efficiency at
the cost of a small interaction, such as the Smart-Chen-Kudla key agreement [36].
Also, it is important to note that the SOK key exchange uses a so-called Type-1
pairing [62]. In general however, it is possible to implement pairing-based protocols
more efficiently using a more general definition of a pairing. That is, given a bilinear
map e : G1 × G2 → GT , where G1 and G2 are cyclic elliptic curve groups and GT is
a cyclic subgroup of the multiplicative group of a finite field of the same order as G1
and G2 , a Type-1 pairing is a pairing where G1 = G2 . While Type-1 pairings offer the
simplest way to describe a pairing-based cryptosystem, they are often not the most
efficient to implement. A Type-3 pairing is a pairing where there are no efficiently
computable homomorphisms between G1 and G2 . The most efficient known pairings
to compute are Type-3. While Type-1 pairings are simpler to design cryptosystems,
Chaterjee and Menezes [34] provide a natural transformation of a Type-1 protocol to
a Type-3 protocol. Chapter 5 discusses further details and performance implications
of using different protocols and primitives in the context of RFID-scale networking.
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CHAPTER 3
PRIVACY ISSUES OF SMART METERING

This chapter shows that even without detailed knowledge of appliance signatures
a priori or prior training, it is possible to extract complex usage patterns from smart
meter data using off-the-shelf statistical methods. The methods outlined in this
chapter are able to label specific types of activity in the home over time based on a
number of characteristics, including the level of power consumption, its intermittency,
and its duration [108].1
Issues of privacy involving smart meter data are becoming increasingly important
due to the widespread deployment of smart meters, which collect and send data to a
centralized location. This model has serious privacy implications since the aggregator
inadvertently gains detailed information about household activities. The current
practice for achieving privacy is simply trusting this aggregator—usually the utility
provider—to protect information from others and respect the privacy of individuals.
In a Facebook-world where users willingly share invasive details of their private lives
with friends and strangers, the ability to extract this information may not appear to
be an egregious violation of privacy. However, with a relatively small amount of data,
it is possible to infer detailed information about household activity—questions such
as how many people are in a home at a given time and whether a resident went out
for dinner on a particular evening, for example.
1

This section draws from previously published work: “Private Memoirs of a Smart Meter” by A.
Molina-Markham, P. Shenoy, K. Fu, E. Cecchet, and D. Irwin. In 2nd ACM Workshop on Embedded
Sensing Systems for Energy-Efficiency in Buildings. November 2010.
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Research on nonintrusive load monitoring (NILM) has shown that it is possible to
disambiguate individual appliance usage from an aggregate smart meter power trace
by using prior knowledge of an appliance’s power signature [97]. Such techniques
reduce or eliminate the need for outlet- or appliance-level meters, since they are able
to extract detailed usage information for individual appliances from an aggregate
household power trace. The approach in this chapter shows that prior knowledge is
not required in order to correlate power traces with user activity. Entities that gather
large amounts of data would potentially be able to predict even more detailed facts,
such as residents’ genders and ages. Such information is a foundation for building
powerful analytic tools for predicting behavior that could potentially be misused by
companies or even criminals.
The ability to correlate power segments to human activity increases with the granularity of the measurements. Therefore this work provides a basis to support the idea
that the data that is reported directly to analysts should have a coarse granularity.
Even if dynamic pricing requires high granularity measurements for calculating a bill,
only information at coarse granularities should be shared with utilities.

3.1

Contribution

The work in this chapter is the first to demonstrate that it is possible to identify
power segments without prior knowledge using off-the-shelf statistical techniques. An
analysis of power traces at fine granularity demonstrates potential privacy leakage by
smart meters. Sending power traces with resolution of a few seconds to utility companies would enable them to answer specific questions about individuals’ activities.
While other research on nonintrusive load monitoring has depended on prior knowledge of a business, residence, or set of appliances, this chapter shows that as the
granularity of measurements of a smart meter increases, the need for prior knowledge
to infer information decreases.
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3.2

Smart Metering

Recently, there has been an increasing focus on “greening the home” using a
combination of fine-grained power consumption monitoring, smart appliances, and
renewable energy sources, e.g., rooftop solar panels. The trends have led to the
design of smart electric grids that provide support for various technologies, including
net metering, demand response, distributed generation, and microgrids [94]. An
important component of a future smart grid is the installation of smart (or net)
meters in homes that support both dynamic pricing and a two-way flow of electricity
between homes (or microgrids) and the larger grid. As these meters become more
sophisticated, they are able to measure household power consumption at ever finer
time-scales. Initial deployments of the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) in
Ontario, Canada support meter readings at 5 to 60 minute intervals [31]. The next
generation of smart meters will reduce these time intervals to one minute or less. For
instance, in July 2010, PECO, one of the largest providers of electricity and gas in
the U.S., selected Sensus to provide an AMI with meters that support one minute
intervals [139] such as the one illustrated in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1. Smart meter installed in the state of Pennsylvania in 2012.
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3.3

Dynamic Pricing and Optimizing Distribution

One of the motivations for smart meters is the possibility of implementing dynamic
pricing schemes that provide incentives for consumers to use electricity at times when
the demand is lower. This would result in a significant reduction in infrastructure
over-provisioning, which has been the main approach for dealing with peak demands.
Additionally, utility companies envision that this consumer feedback would allow for
better handling of temporary surpluses and enable collaboration with users to stop
or minimize consumption when the grid is overloaded.
Another goal of implementing smart meters is the ability to collect information
that would allow utilities to perform mid- and long-term planning. For example,
utility companies would benefit from knowing the consumption trends of populations,
such as whether more electric cars are being charged or neighborhoods are switching
to more energy-efficient appliances.

3.4

Implications of Privacy Leakage through Smart Metering

Recent work by Quinn [122] provides an overview of the privacy implications of
fine-grained power consumption monitoring. While Quinn does not present specific
techniques or conduct a detailed data analysis, he posits that those with access to
smart meter data will be able to infer answers to many questions about a household’s personal, and potentially private, activity. While the answers to some of these
questions may seem innocuous, e.g., when do people watch TV, others are quite disturbing, e.g., is there a newborn in the house. Table 3.1 highlights a few of these
private questions, along with the power consumption pattern that may reveal their
answer. The table also lists the monitoring granularity we believe a smart meter
requires to accurately identify the necessary pattern. For instance, a relatively low
level of power consumption and variation may indicate that no one is home, while
power activity every few hours throughout every night may indicate regular nighttime
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Question
Were you home during
your sick leave?

Pattern
Yes: Power activities during the day
No: Low power usage during the
day
Did you get a good
Yes: No power events overnight for
night’s sleep?
at least 6 hours
No:
Random power events
overnight
Did you watch the game Yes: Appliance activity matching
last night?
TV program
No: No power event in accordance
with game showtime
Did you leave late for
Yes: Last power event time later
work?
than Google maps estimated travel
time
No: Last power event time leaves
enough time for commute
Did you leave your child Yes: Single person activity pattern
home alone?
No: Simultaneous power events in
distinct areas of the house
Do you eat hot or cold
Hot: Burst of power events in
breakfast?
the morning (microwave/coffee machine/toaster)
Cold: No power event matching hot
breakfast appliances

Granularity
Hour/Minute

Hour/Minute

Minute/Second

Minute

Minute/Second

Second

Table 3.1. Private questions and answers that fine-grained power consumption data
reveals.

feedings for a newborn. Even answers to seemingly innocuous questions may prove
valuable to third-parties, e.g. for adjusting insurance rates, targeting advertising
campaigns, resolving legal disputes, or conducting criminal investigations.

3.5

Methodology to Estimate Privacy Leakage

Revealing complex usage patterns is not difficult with an approach that opaquely
labels different types of household activity. This approach leverages simple off-the-shelf
clustering and pattern recognition techniques on 2 months of power consumption data
from 3 homes. To gather the data, each home’s main circuit breaker is instrumented
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Figure 3.2. Architecture using a TED monitor as a smart meter.

with a TED energy monitor [8] that logs household power consumption every second.
Figure 3.2 graphically depicts the architecture. The TED monitor uses the home’s
power circuits to transmit power readings to a TED gateway that makes them available via a built-in web browser. An embedded SheevaPlug computer in each home
downloads second-level data each hour from the TED gateway and transmits it to a
central repository for analysis. Each entry in the TED data log consists of a power
tuple (t, p) that includes a timestamp t and the average power consumption p in kilowatts over the previous second. The one-second logging granularity is smaller than
that of existing smart meters [9], which allows for the identification of many patterns
that are not possible with current meters.
This analysis consists of four steps: 1) pre-process power traces using an off-theshelf clustering algorithm to identify and label similar types of power events, 2) tag
each power event with one or more defining characteristics, 3) filter out automated
appliances by observing their signatures during periods of low power activity, and
4) map opaque labels to real-life events using a small amount of externally gathered
knowledge.
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Evening Activities:
Dinner, Showers,
Laundry, Working
on Computer

Breakfast

Getting
Ready to
Leave:
Showers,
Breakfast,
etc

Water
Heater

Shower

Water
Heater

Water
Heater

Overnight
Period
Refrigerator

Time (Hours) vs Power Usage (kW)

Figure 3.3. Example day-long second-level power trace with labels from the day’s
activity log.

11:20 PM

8:00 PM

4:40 PM
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M Tu W Th F Sa Su M Tu
Detected Morning or All Day Activity
Detected Evening Activity
Detected Unusual Activity

Figure 3.4. Identification of human presence with high probability for each day of
the month.
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3.6

Results

• Label Power Events: First each power trace is pre-processed using a densitybased clustering algorithm (DBSCAN [56] as implemented by WEKA [74]) to
group together power tuples into power segments. A power segment is simply a
collection of tuples with a particular pattern of power consumption values that
are adjacent in time. Power segments often have a constant power consumption
over a given time period, although this is not required. In some cases, events of
the same shape are identified, such as a steep ramp-up and then leveling off. The
algorithm labels the power segments such that segments with a similar pattern
receive the same label. In many figures, these labels are distinguished using
different colors. DBSCAN was chosen because of its simplicity. There are other
potentially more sophisticated, algorithms, such as CLIQUE [12], MAFIA [65],
DENCLUE [76]. However, even this simple approach is able to detect household
activities with high accuracy.
160,000

Unusual Events
Regular Events
Complete Absence
Partial Absence

140,000

Power Usage (KWh)

120,000

100,000

80,000

60,000

40,000

20,000

0
2010-05-15

2010-05-21

2010-05-27

2010-06-02

2010-06-08

2010-06-14

2010-06-20

2010-06-26

2010-07-02

2010-07-08

2010-07-14

Time (Days)

Figure 3.5. Low power periods correspond to little human activity over a two-month
trace for one home.
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• Tag Power Events: Each power segment is appended with a few distinguishing
attributes. The primary attributes are each power segment’s duration and its
power step, i.e, the power increase or decrease at the beginning of the segment.
Power segments are also labeled with a particular shape if the power level was
not constant. In this case, non-constant shapes are identified and labeled manually, although it is possible to automate the process. The result is a 6-tuple
that includes the segment’s label, start time, average power, duration, beginning
power step, and shape label. These 6-tuples can be automatically processed to
answer different types of queries on the data. For example, repetitive usage
patterns are identified by filtering for power segments with the same duration,
beginning power step, and shape. Figure 3.3 shows power segments (appended
with labels from our activity logs) in a typical day for one of the homes. In
this figure, a high variation in color corresponds to human activity, e.g., periods
between 8:00 AM - 9:30 AM and 6:30 PM - midnight. Using the intuitive observation that relatively high power consumption and variation indicates human
activity, Figure 3.4 reveals when people were in one of the homes over the course
of a month with weekends highlighted.
• Filter Automated Appliances: Figure 3.3 also demonstrates that while nearly all
human-triggered power events correspond to the beginning of a power segment,
there are many segments that do not correspond to any human interaction. To
obtain only power segments associated with human activity, the power signatures of automated appliances, such as refrigerators, heating or air conditioning,
are filtered out. The intuitive observation that periods of low power activity
correlate well with periods of little human activity is leveraged to isolate signatures. Figure 3.5 illustrates this point, identifying periods of low activity in
a home over the 60-day trace. Likewise, periods of high activity correlate with
more people being inside the home, i.e., for a get-together or party. Figure 3.6
30

Time (Hours) vs Power Usage (kW)

Figure 3.6. Power signatures for a dehumidifier and an air re-circulator. Note that
the dehumidifier shuts off after it fills up.

shows power signatures for appliances during an absence from the home. In this
case, the signatures correspond to a dehumidifier that runs for 2 hours every 4
hours, and an air re-circulator that runs for 20 minutes every hour.
• Map Events to Real Life: After collecting and analyzing a sufficient amount
of data, it is possible to identify patterns of recurring clusters according to
their characteristics. Powerful data mining techniques could be applied to the
obtained power segments. For example, the grouped power segments shown in
Figure 3.6 could be filtered out automatically by entering them in a clustering
algorithm, this time in supervised mode. Alternatively, tagged power segments
could also be classified and matched to future occurrences. Further, pattern
matching can be improved and past instances can be re-analyzed when new
appliances are disambiguated. To illustrate this, Figure 3.7 shows in detail the
disambiguation of power segments (identified by different colors). In this case,
clustering distinguishes opaque events but not specific appliances or activities.
An entity that had access to large amounts of data could then classify these
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Stove

Computer
Screen 2

Toaster
Coffee Maker
Computer
Screen 1
Time (Seconds) vs Power Usage (kW)

Figure 3.7. Power segments from eating breakfast. The clustering algorithm automatically generates the color scheme. The labels are from the activity logs.
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Figure 3.8. Example of the power segments from taking a shower, including labels
from our activity logs.
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Stove

Computer
Screen 2
Toaster
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Computer
Screen 1
Time (30s intervals) vs Power Usage (kW)

Figure 3.9. An example of the same power segments from Figure 3.7, but at a 30
second logging granularity.

events based on prior knowledge. In this case, knowledge from activity journals
is utilized. Each home manually kept detailed power activity journals for at
least 3 days over the 60 day period to provide some knowledge of activities
in the home. These journals were as accurate as possible, and recorded rough
timestamps for turning on and off every light switch and appliance throughout
the day. Using the data from these activity journals, the opaque power segments
are mapped to specific types of real-life events. The segments in Figure 3.7
that were identified by the clustering algorithm have been marked with arrows
corresponding to activities logged by the individuals living in the home. The
clustering algorithm finds power segments for the stove, coffee maker, toaster
and two computer screens, which is enough to answer the question in Table 3.1
about whether a person had a hot or cold breakfast that morning. Note that the
algorithm is able to delimit these segments despite the simultaneous operation
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of other appliances. To demonstrate the importance of the logging granularity,
Figure 3.9 shows the same trace as Figure 3.7, but with a 30-second logging
granularity. In this case, the pattern reveals little about the usage of each
separate component.

3.7

Conclusion

This chapter highlights the issue of privacy in smart metering. A simple approach
to label usage patterns using off-the-shelf statistical techniques illustrates the potentially private information that can be learned from power traces, such as when
occupants are home, the number of occupants in a household, and their eating and
sleeping patterns. Questions such as: Did you leave your child home alone? or Did
you get a good nights sleep? can be answered by analyzing these traces. As the granularity of the measurements increases, the capability of obtaining more information
will grow, especially when a centralized entity has access to data from thousands or
millions of households.
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CHAPTER 4
PRIVACY-PRESERVING SMART METERING WITH
LOW-COST MICROCONTROLLERS

This chapter discusses a solution for implementing a privacy-preserving smart
meter architecture that enables an electric utility to achieve its net metering goals,
while respecting the privacy of its consumers. The approach leverages the notion
of Zero-Knowledge proofs and provides cryptographic guarantees for the integrity,
authenticity, and correctness of payments, while allowing variable pricing without
revealing the power measurements gathered during a billing period.
A key impediment to the widespread adoption of privacy-preserving billing protocols is the computational and memory constraints of smart meters, which, due to
cost, size, and power considerations, typically use embedded microcontrollers. Prior
work does not measure these resource constraints, and, thus, implicitly assumes that
meters are capable of executing protocols in a reasonable amount of time. This chapter1 explores the economic feasibility of implementing the cryptographic techniques
required for privacy-preserving smart metering and proposes a general methodology
for evaluating the cost of a solution [107]. This analysis takes into account current
smart meter deployments and looks at the hardware technologies utilities are adopting
over both the short- and long-term. The focus is on implementing cryptographic techniques on smart meters such as those proposed by Rial et al. [126], Molina-Markham

1

This chapter draws from previously published work: “Designing Privacy-preserving Smart Meters with Low-cost Microcontrollers” by A. Molina-Markham, G. Danezis, K. Fu, P. Shenoy, and D.
Irwin. In Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data
Security. February 2012.
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et al. [108], Kursawe et al. [92] and Jawurek et al. [82]. However, this methodology
also applies to estimating the cost of similar metering systems that require privacy,
including natural gas, water, and toll roads, such as the one proposed by Balasch et
al. [14].

4.1

Contributions

The contributions of this chapter are:
1. System: This chapter describes the results of designing and implementing a
privacy-friendly smart meter using low-cost microcontrollers from both the
Texas Instruments MSP430 and the ARM families. It presents the first experimental results that actually measure the performance of a Camenisch-Lysyanskaya [28]
(CL) based scheme using elliptic curves in constrained environments. Previous
work [126] discusses and estimates, but does not include implementation results.
The most comparable realization of a CL based scheme uses a Java Card [18]
and does not include an elliptic curve version.
2. Cost Evaluation: This chapter outlines a cost evaluation strategy for implementing privacy-preserving smart meters that accounts for the special characteristics
of low-cost microcontrollers and industry trends. In particular, it lists a set of
system variables that designers may modify to balance security, privacy, and
cost. This is the first discussion of the issues surrounding ultra-low-power implementations, which in some applications may make the difference between
a meter that requires a battery replacement every few years versus every few
days.
3. Feasibility Analysis: This chapter presents evidence to support the hypothesis
that ZKP billing protocols are feasible on current deployments of smart meters
and cost effective on deployments over both the short- and long-term. Because
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some smart meters can be remotely updated, it is plausible that a deployment
may be implemented in one of these updates. In the long-term, these experimental results may help system designers to assess the performance and cost
benefits of utilizing elliptic curve primitives. This analysis takes into account
the evolution of the storage and computational capabilities of low-cost microcontrollers and contrasts it to the evolution of personal computer processors.

4.2

A Zero-Knowledge Proof System for Billing

The study in this chapter focuses on the efficient implementation of the meter
cryptographic components for the Rial and Danezis [126] privacy preserving smart
metering protocols. Proposals by [82] can be adapted to use the same meter components.
We illustrate the protocol with an example that includes three principals, as depicted in Figure 4.1: the smart meter, the prover, and the verifier. The smart meter
first measures and certifies consumer electricity readings, and then communicates
them to the prover using a secure channel. The prover, a consumer-owned device,
computes a bill along with a non-interactive ZKP that ensures the bill’s validity. The
prover sends the bill and the proof to the utility company, which verifies the bill’s
correctness before accepting it. Below, we describe in detail the computations the
meter has to perform, and provide a brief outline of the protocols between the prover
and the verifier.
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Privacy-Preserving Meter
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Reading Certification
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•
•
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•

Derive Keys
Encrypt Readings
Compute Commitments
Create Batch Signature
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Consumer Device

Utility Provider's Server
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Derive Keys
Decrypt Readings
Reconstruct Commitments

Bill Verification
•
•

Verify Bill
Verify Proof

Bill Computation
•
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Accept Bill

Compute Bill
Compute Proof

Figure 4.1. Architecture of the privacy-preserving smart metering system. A smart
meter, in addition to its metrologic unit, has a microcontroller capable of encrypting and certifying its readings. The meter also has a wireless transceiver used to
send encrypted readings to the consumer’s device. The consumer uses the information from the meter for consumption planning, and in the computation of bills and
corresponding proofs.

4.2.1

Smart Meter Computations

To support privacy protocols, smart meters need to perform the following computations: sensing and measuring electricity usage, deriving session keys, certifying and
encrypting readings, and finally transmitting readings to the consumer.
• Sensing and measuring electricity: The meter’s primary function is sensing and
measuring electricity usage. Thus, other computations must not interfere with
this fundamental task. We denote ∆t as the measurement interval, such that
duration between meter readings ti+1 − ti = ∆t.
• Deriving session keys: The protocol encrypts readings using a symmetric encryption algorithm before passing them to the user. To ensure the encrypted
reading’s secrecy, each reading is encrypted with a distinct session key. For
every ti the meter encrypts reading ri using key Ki = H0 (K, ti ), where H0 is a
secure hash function and K is a master symmetric key known by the consumer.
Additionally, the meter derives from the master key an opening value for the
commitment oi = H1 (K, ti ) where H1 is a hash function.
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• Certification and encryption: After deriving Ki and oi , the meter both encrypts
the reading ri using Ki and computes a commitment ci for the reading. More
formally, the meter generates an encrypted reading Eri = E(Ki , ri ) using a
symmetric encryption algorithm, and a commitment ci = g ri · hoi using globally
known constants g, h, and their group. The protocol also requires the meter to
generate cryptographic signatures for each commitment ci . To reduce the necessary computations, the protocol computes batch signatures Sigj for multiple
commitments ci , ci+1 , . . . , ci+k .
• Network transmission: After the meter encrypts readings and computes batches
of signatures, it transmits the batches to the consumer’s device (the prover) via
the local network. More formally, for each batch j, the meter transmits the
following tuples to the consumer: {{ti }j , {Eri }j , Sigj }. The commitments need
not be transmitted, which keeps the overheads of the protocol low.

4.2.2

Consumer Prover Computations

The prover computes the bill’s payment and its corresponding proof of correctness.
First, the prover derives the session keys Ki = H0 (K, ti ) on the basis of times ti and
the master key K; decrypts the readings ri from Eri = E(Ki , ri ), and derives the
opening values from each commitment as oi = H1 (K, ti ). Then all commitments
to readings can be reconstructed as ci = g ri · hoi using the public parameters of
the commitment scheme and the recovered readings and openings. Finally, a batch
of commitments are accepted as authentic after checking the signature Sigj . This
ensures that the received encrypted readings have not been tampered with. After the
readings and their signed commitments are available, an arbitrary billing function
can be applied to each reading (or aggregates of readings) to establish the final bill.
The prover calculates a ZKP of correctness and provides it to the verifier.
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The details of those computations, and families of functions that can be practically proved and verified in zero-knowledge are provided in [126] along with the
detailed security proofs for the protocol. To summarize, fine-grained meter readings
are only available to the consumer, while simultaneously allowing the consumer to
self-calculate their bill and ensuring the utility that the consumer has not manipulated or under-reported the payment. Thus, the utility has a guarantee over each
bill’s authenticity, and the consumer has a guarantee over their data’s privacy. To resolve disputes, the meter may optionally store readings and decryption keys to permit
audits by a trusted third party.

4.3

Background on Microcontrollers

The computational capabilities of low-cost and ultra-low-power microcontrollers
have not developed at the same pace as high-performance microprocessors employed
in servers and personal computers. System designers should, therefore, use different
means to evaluate the economic feasibility of a cryptographic solution in the low-cost
spectrum of embedded devices. This section presents the set of design variables of the
various implementations considered in this chapter with the purpose of illustrating
their effects on performance and cost.
Moore’s law predicted that the number of transistors placed in an integrated circuit would double approximately every two years. This prediction, however, does
not directly address two issues that are pertinent to microcontrollers. First, the production costs associated with maintaining this trend have not remained constant.
Second, with the addition of more transistors, the problem of efficient power management has significantly increased [47]. As a consequence, microcontrollers that are
often constrained by production costs and power budgets have not increased their
computational capabilities at the same rate as microprocessors for servers and per-
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sonal computers. Figure 4.2 illustrates this by showing the evolution in processing
capabilities across different technologies.
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Figure 4.2. This graph provides a visual representation of performance improvements as seen across a few popular architectures. The trends in microprocessors
targeting desktop computers and servers, as well as the performance improvements
observed in ARM application microprocessors have followed exponential curves. However, the performance improvements observed in embedded ARM microprocessors and
MSP430 microcontrollers have followed linear curves [10, 35, 80]. Note that a comparison based on microprocessors using millions of instructions per second does not
capture all qualities of a microprocessor, but it helps to illustrate general trends.

4.4

Anatomy of a Smart Meter

Figure 4.3 shows the schematics of a smart meter. In general, they are equipped
with an analog front end, which is part of the metrologic unit used to convert the
data coming from the load sensors and preprocess the measurements before they are
passed to the microcontroller unit. The microcontroller unit handles this stream of
data as well as the general functionality of storing the data in flash memory, and
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driving an LCD screen. More modern microcontrollers replace the analog front end
with an integrated embedded signal processor. Current deployments of smart meters
use microcontrollers that run at clock speeds ranging from 8-25 MHz and have storage
ranging from 32-256 KB [116].
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sensor
Analog
Frontend

MCU
sensor

I In
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Application
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Figure 4.3. Main components of a smart meter. On the left: A simple meter
with a single microcontroller unit (MCU) that controls the metrologic unit, storage
and communication interfaces. On the right: A smart meter that replaces the analog
front end with an embedded signal processor (ESP) and has an additional application
processor that controls communication, OS, power monitoring, and analytics.

4.5

Meter Design Variables

Below is the set of design variables that are considered in the implementations.
Some of these design variables correspond to features, such as qualitative privacy or
security guarantees, e.g. properties of a trust or security model. Other design variables correspond to quantitative properties, for example computation performance,
storage and communication requirements. The design variables in these implementations are in one of two categories, system variables or crypto variables. System
variables include the selection of an MCU platform and a multitasking approach.
Crypto variables include the selection of a digital signature scheme, and the selection of cryptographic primitives that rely on large integer multiplicative groups
or elliptic curve cryptography. Note that a complete analysis of the economic feasibility of a metering solution should also include a variety of economic variables,
for example, the costs of implementation, deployment, maintenance and customer
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support. These economic variables are not considered explicitly in this work. The
assumption is that if a solution can be implemented using microcontrollers, such as
those in currently deployed meters, and those meters support software updates, then
the solution is economically feasible given that it does not require a complete change
in infrastructure. For example, rather than forcing millions of deployments, utility
companies could offer concerned customers the option to request a meter update that
implements the privacy features mentioned here.

4.6

A Privacy-Preserving Smart Meter

The meter needs to compute the algorithms Commit, CLSign and DSA, using
either large integer multiplicative groups or elliptic curve cryptography. Also a meter
needs to compute a symmetric key derivation algorithm DeriveAESKeys to encrypt
readings with AES for on-site wireless transmission. These algorithms together produce certified readings. The libraries to perform integer or elliptic curve arithmetic are
bnlib [121] and Miracl [32] respectively. Additionally, one of the following Real-Time
Operating Systems may be used: FreeRTOS [16], SYS/BIOS [142] and MicroC/OSIII [93]. The rest of the implementation is in C, with some minimal amount of
assembly code. The focus is on the MSP430 family of microcontrollers with a 16-bit
RISC architecture because current deployments already include microcontrollers in
this family. The implementations use the evaluation board MSP-EXP430F5438, in
combination with the microcontrollers MSP430BT5190 and MSP430F5438A with the
radio stack CC2567-PAN1327. The board includes an LCD screen and connectors for
radio components. Both microcontrollers are from the same family (MSP430x5xx).
Shared characteristics include the availability of a hardware multiplier supporting 32bit operations, size of flash (256 KB), frequency (25 MHz), and power consumption
(∼ 230 µA/MHz in active mode). The manufacturers designed the MSP430BT5190
for use with the radio stack; however, the MSP430F5438A has a larger RAM (16 KB).
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The evaluation compares a few ARM microcontrollers and processors. ARM ports are
readily available for the arithmetic libraries mentioned above. The code is compiled
using IAR Embedded Workbench for ARM version 6.30 [78]. The most significant
difference is that the word size for the multi-precision arithmetic is 32 instead of 16 as
in the MSP430 implementations. The other microcontroller board is the TI Stellaris
Evaluation Board EKB-UCOS3-EVM. The ARM processors measured—intended for
smartphone development—are capable of running full Linux distributions; nevertheless, they are measured using IAR Workbench as well.
The full ZKP based billing protocol requires the selection of various building
blocks, such as commitment schemes and signatures. The security of these building
blocks may depend on either the strong RSA (SRSA) assumption [27], or on the discrete logarithm (LRSW) assumption [28]. One important side-effect of the selection
of these building blocks is that in order for the SRSA assumption to hold, the cryptographic operations need to be performed over multiplicative groups of integers with
large moduli (1,024 to 2,048 bits in length). However, by leveraging modern Elliptic
Curve Cryptography, the designer can use building blocks that rely on the discrete
logarithm assumption employing considerably smaller key sizes. Therefore, for the
ECC based commitments and ECDSA implementations, the NIST curves P-192 and
P-224 [40] were used. For the ECC versions of the CL Signatures, the implementation uses the pairing-friendly elliptic curves E(F2379 ) : y 2 + y = x3 + x + 1 and
E(Fp ) : y 2 = x3 + Ax + B with a 512-bit prime p as presented in [138].
The criteria for choosing curve parameters for ECDSA and the commitment
scheme in this implementation are well known. However, choosing appropriate parameters for pairing-based cryptography is still an active area of research. That is,
using an elliptic curve implementation for CL-signatures requires an appropriate bilinear map e : G × G → H that is non-degenerate and easy to compute. There is no
unique way to obtain this map using elliptic curve groups G, H. While most proto-
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cols, such as signatures and identity based encryption protocols are designed using a
type-1 pairing, it is often possible to use a type-3 pairing. The latter are typically
more efficient in practice. In other words, protocols often assume the existence of a
pairing e : G×G → H (type-1). However, in some cases the designer can implement a
protocol that assumes the existence of a pairing e : G1 × G2 → H with G1 6= G2 such
that there is no isomorphism ψ : G2 → G1 (type-3). This implementation uses type-1
pairings on a super-singular curve defined over GF (2m ) using the ηT pairing [15] and
on a super-singular curve defined over GF (p) using a modified Tate pairing [137].
In order for the curves to provide an adequate security guarantee, the size of the
key must be large enough so that the corresponding dilogarithm problem in H is hard.
For the purposes of the particular billing protocol described in this chapter, a smart
meter needs to compute signatures and not necessarily verify them. Therefore, one
would want to make operations on the curve as cheap as possible, even if that means
computing more expensive parings on the consumer’s device. For more details on
pairings see Devegili et al. [42].

4.7

Experimental Evaluation

The experimental results here show that a range of microcontrollers are capable
of generating certified readings in a few seconds. Using ECC primitives, it is possible
to achieve the best performance. In the case of a Texas Instruments MSP430F5438A,
a reading can be computed in under 10 seconds. The use of ECC also allows for
adequate security key sizes. The larger the precision of the numbers that are used,
the larger the RAM requirements; therefore due to the limitations on microcontrollers,
using traditional primitives with integers with large precisions is not possible.
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4.7.1

Impact of Platform Selection

The cryptographic operations Commit and CLSign are implemented using microcontrollers from two of the most popular families, specifically, a microcontroller
MSP430F5438A with 256 KB flash, 16 KB RAM and a microcontroller Stellaris
LM3S9B92 (ARM Cortex M) with 256 KB flash, 96 KB SRAM; and two ARM application microprocessors OMAP3 (ARM Cortex A8) and OMAP4 (ARM Cortex A9)
capable of running full Linux operating systems. These two microprocessors are commonly used in smart phones. The performances of these operations on these platforms
are summarized in Table 4.7.2.

4.7.2

Impact of Multitasking Approach

Meters need to be able to interrupt cryptographic computations periodically to
perform measurements, logging and communication. One way of handling multitasking is with the use of an RTOS. Another way is the modeling of an application
using a finite state machine and the implementation of it using timers and interrupts.
Generally, the footprint of an RTOS is larger than the footprint of a state machine
approach. The following three RTOS are considered here: FreeRTOS, SYS\BIOS and
µC-OSIII. The configurations for each of the RTOS uses 4 KB, 16 KB and 12 KB of
code size respectively. The finite state machine requires approximately 2 KB of code.
RTOS have the capability of managing memory; some by reserving particular regions
of the stack for different applications, and some by allowing for the use of dynamic
memory allocation even with multiple heaps, such as SYS\BIOS. It is typically not
a trivial engineering exercise to fit each cryptographic algorithm in RAM. Note that
the system designer should probably base the decision of whether or not to use an
RTOS on the necessity of additional required functionality, such as occasional tasks
like secure updates, secure audits, key exchange and key revocation, etc.
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MSP430F5438A
LM3S9B92
Cortex-A8 Cortex-A9
Operating Freq
25 MHz
80 MHz
720 MHz
1 GHz
Operating Power
330 - 690 µW
333 - 524 mW
0.4 W
1.9 W
Family Price Range
$0.25 - $9
$1 - $8
$41 - $46
+$50
Commitments - Key Size 1,024 bits
Avg. Running Time
19.56 s
0.82 s
51 ms
36 ms
DSA Signatures - Key Size 1,024 bits
Avg. Running Time
2.71 s
0.13 s
8 ms
6 ms
CL Signatures - Key Size 1,024 bits
Avg. Running Time
43.1 s
2.3 s
150 ms
81 ms
Table 4.1. Running time of commitments and signatures across multiple platforms.
The tasks are run exclusively and uninterrupted on each of the platforms. The signatures are performed on 16 bytes of data. DSA uses a 1,024-bit prime p, a 160-bit
prime q, and SHA-256. The timing does not include the generation of randomness,
which depends on the source. Prices are in USD (Sept., 2011).

4.7.3

Impact of ECC Utilization

The code sizes of the bnlib [121] and Miracl [32] libraries and their RAM requirements depend on which features that are included. In the experimental setting using
a microcontroller MSP430F5438A, the code size of Miracl was 23 KB and the code
size of bnlib was 18 KB. The performance of bnlib and Miracl on non-ECC arithmetic is comparable. The running times of the same operation using either library
differed by less than 5% of the total computation time of the operation. The RAM
footprint for various functions is summarized in Table 4.3. As one can see, given a
security level, ECC cryptographic primitives utilize RAM more efficiently. Similarly,
Table 4.2 shows that given a microcontroller and a security level, an improvement in
performance of about one order of magnitud can be achieved by using elliptic curve
primitives.

4.7.4

Impact of Signature Scheme Selection

Table 4.2 shows running times for performing a CLSign algorithm with four readings. Note in particular the benefit of using an elliptic curve based library. If a
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Algorithm Key Size
Commit
1,024
Commit
2,048
ECC Commit
192
ECC Commit
224
CLSign
1,024
CLSign
2,048
ECC CLSign
379
ECC CLSign
512
AES Key Gen
128

Library
bnlib
bnlib
miracl
miracl
bnlib
bnlib
miracl
miracl
miracl

Time
19.9 sec
303.0 sec
5.6 sec
8.3 sec
41.2 sec
313.8 sec
6.7 sec
35.6 sec
0.1 sec

Table 4.2. Running time of commitments (single reading) and signatures (4 reading
batches) on an MSP430F5438A at 25 MHz. These times are obtained when the
algorithms are running exclusively and uninterrupted. Miracl is used for the elliptic
curve versions (§4.6). The key sizes are in bits.

designer uses elliptic curves, he or she can reduce a monthly batch signature with
1,440 readings (one reading every half hour) from 15.6 hours to 2.5 hours. If the
designer assumes a different trust level in which zero-knowledge is not required, signatures are less expensive. On an MSP430F5438A at 25 MHz, signing a 16-byte
message using regular DSA with a 1,024-bit prime p, a 160-bit prime q, and SHA-256
takes 2.71 seconds excluding the generation of randomness, which depends on the
source. Signing a 16-byte message using ECDSA using a curve in GF (p) for a 192-bit
prime and SHA-256 takes 3.78 seconds excluding the generation of randomness. DSA
signatures scale better than CL-signatures because the only overhead for a larger
message would be the cost of the hash, which for the computations above is less than
0.01% of the computation.

4.8

Feasibility and Costs in Real-World Deployments

This section discusses a strategy for estimating the cost of deploying privacy preserving smart meters according to the system variables discussed previously (§4.6).
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Algorithm Key Size
Commit
1,024
Commit
2,048
CLSign
1,024
CLSign
2,048
ECC Commit
192
ECC Commit
224
ECC CLSign
379
ECC CLSign
512
AES Key Gen
128

RAM
5.8 KB
10.2 KB
6.3 KB
11.3 KB
2.2 KB
2.5 KB
3.1 KB
3.6 KB
2 KB

Table 4.3. RAM utilization for the various algorithms we implement on an
MSP430F5438A all using the Miracl library. The measurements do not include RAM
utilization by an RTOS, a radio stack or I/O.

4.8.1

Cost Estimation Strategy

1. Determine the performance and power requirements: The first step is to determine the acceptable levels of general computational performance and the
power requirements of the meter. Depending on the specific application, meter readings may need to be certified with a frequency of seconds, minutes or
hours. Also, the meter may need to operate on a battery. Thus, using an
ultra-low-power microcontroller may be the difference between replacing the
battery every few years or every few days. For example, the performance of an
LM3S9B92 MCU may seem attractive for its ratio of cost/performance. However, the power consumption is roughly three orders of magnitude greater than
the MSP430 MCU. Mobile processors are still far from being ultra-low power,
although their computational and storage capabilities are increasing faster than
those of the MCUs.
2. Determine the code and RAM requirements: Once the performance and power
requirements are met by a family of microcontrollers, it is then necessary for
the designer to estimate the code size and RAM requirements for the imple-
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mentation of the reading certification functions in a meter, taking into account
whether multitasking needs to be supported.
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Figure 4.4. Memory requirements on an MSP430F5438A.

4.8.2

Economic Feasibility

Existing smart meters that have the ability to be remotely updated rely on microcontrollers similar to those used in the implementation in this chapter. If a microcontroller in the MSP430 family is used, it is possible to generate commitments and
CL-signatures every 10 seconds when running at 25 MHz or every 28 seconds when
running at a more conservative 8 MHz. Thus, a remote update that enables meters
with privacy preserving functionality appears feasible.
Other metering applications may require that readings be certified at a finer granularity, for example every one or two seconds. This would require higher computational
performance and larger storage than is currently available on low-cost ultra-low-power
microcontrollers. For this reason, while obtaining certified readings at fine granular50

ities is technologically feasible, it is to this date a feature that may incur a greater
cost. Finally, in some circumstances, billing transactions may be required to take milliseconds. In that case, only high-end mobile processors could provide the required
performance, and thus the cost of that application would be high based on current
technological trends.
While the analysis in this section does not cover all manufacturers of low cost
MCUs, other leading manufacturers have similar offerings. For example Atmel also
has AVR ultra-low-power microcontrollers, and various ARM based MCUs comparable to those discussed here. Microchip has the PIC microcontroller line with 8-, 16and 32-bit MCUs. 8-bit microcontrollers are not considered because they are perhaps
too constrained for the kind of crypto application described here.
The best security/cost ratio can be achieved by using ECC primitives (§4.7). If
current MCUs are targeted, maximizing the use of RAM can be achieved via ECC.
Looking toward the future, performance will most likely regain importance due to the
increasing economic feasibility of Ferroelectric RAM (FRAM), a kind of memory that
enables high-performance on ultra-low-power microcontrollers, with a unified memory
model. Texas Instruments has started to ship MCUs with 16 KB of FRAM ($1.20
USD), and they are already producing chips with 4 MB of FRAM [119].

4.9

Related Work

Prior work exists on distilling information about appliance usage from power
traces. However, prior approaches assume knowledge of the appliances in a home
or take appliance measurements in order to use supervised learning techniques to disambiguate events. For example, Patel et al. [118] use individual traces from USB
oscilloscopes to disambiguate power traces of particular appliances. Jiang et al. [85]
solve a similar problem by using a wireless sensor network to monitor building energy usage. Similarly, Lam et al. [95] classify appliances based on fine-grained load
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Figure 4.5. Impact of ECC on computation using an MSP430F5438A.

signatures. More accurate monitoring for utilities has many benefits, as prior work
discusses, e.g., [102], [39], [91] but they do not propose techniques to preserve privacy.
An alternative approach to protect privacy is adding noise to load signatures using
rechargeable batteries [87].
Besides the cryptographic solutions described by Rial et al. [126] and MolinaMarkham et al. [108], there are other proposals to provide privacy in the context of
smart grids, including [82]. Methods from the field of differential privacy have been
suggested to provide privacy in this setting, for example [140, 33, 37]. None of these
works explores the feasibility of using low-cost or ultra-low-power microcontrollers.

4.10

Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates that ZKP based solutions to mitigate the problem of
smart metering information leakage are economically feasible. Evaluating the cost of a
cryptographic solution in an embedded system such as a smart meter depends first on
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the family of microcontrollers used, then on the storage and RAM requirements, and
finally on additional features such as communication and user interface. An empirical
analysis shows that with the use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography, it is possible to
reduce the RAM requirements by about 50% and obtain performance improvements
of one order of magnitude, in comparison with using primitives over groups of integers
with large moduli—thus obtaining a better performance/cost ratio.
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CHAPTER 5
BAT: BACKSCATTER ANYTHING-TO-TAG
COMMUNICATION

This chapter presents BAT, a networked system designed from the ground up
to enable RFID applications beyond inventorying [106].1 Computational RFID prototypes are limited by networking abstractions that impose narrow preconceptions
about topologies and applications. These prototypes support programmability and
integrate a wide array of sensors, which open the door to more varied applications [24, 25, 147, 125, 86]. The implementation of these applications on constrained
platforms will need primitives that seamlessly support communication among tags
and also with other devices. While overlays on top of existing protocols are possible,
they introduce inefficiency because of packet formats designed explicitly for the tag
inventory paradigm.
Supply-chain RFID technologies were developed with narrow design goals in mind,
primarily inventorying or data collection. The EPC Gen 2 protocol—the de-facto
standard for UHF RFID communication [55]—reflects these design goals by offering
a limited set of commands not well-suited for bulk data transfers [71]. The assumption
that tags will not implement any functionality locally and will instead act as simple
static identifiers in most cases also imposes other restrictions. Tags must conform to
1

This chapter draws from previously published work in:“BAT: Backscatter Anything-to-tag Communication” by A. Molina-Markham, S. S. Clark, B. Ransford and K. Fu. Chapter in Wirelessly
Powered Sensor Networks and Computational RFID. Springer Signals and Communication. J. R.
Smith (Ed.) December 2012. To appear.
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a rigid state machine allowing no time to sense or process data. They are instead
required to respond to reader commands rapidly whenever in range.
Without protocols that present appropriate abstractions for richer applications,
computational RFIDs (CRFIDs) must use limited resources to shoehorn these new
applications into a suboptimal paradigm [86]. Unlike supply-chain RFID tags, CRFIDs have their own microcontroller units: they are capable of running their own
application logic and managing their own memory and communication links. They
are, therefore, able to participate in radio protocols that are more flexible than Gen 2.
Table 5.1 summarizes some key differences between CRFIDs, supply-chain tags, and
battery-powered sensor nodes (motes).
The BAT protocol and software stack provides fast and flexible backscatter anythingto-tag communication. The key insight is that BAT separates tag applications from
the networking stack by ensuring that the networking layer does not impose unnecessary constraints on abstractions. BAT separates memory management from the
networking stack such that tag applications can efficiently store data in arbitrary
locations without needing several interactions with the network stack. This logical
detachment between the networking stack and applications does not impede secure
anything-to-tag communication even using current CRFID prototypes.
In order to evaluate BAT’s practicality, it was implemented on a current CRFID
prototype and a relay using software radio (§5.5). BAT allows tags to send and receive
data via untrusted relays with a maximum throughput of 18 Kbps. CRFIDs generate
encrypted payload at a rate of 61 Kbps.

5.1

Contributions

The contributions of this chapter are:
1. Networking Stack: This chapter presents the design of a networking stack for
backscatter devices via untrusted relays that offers more appropriate abstrac55

Supply
Chain
Tags

CRFIDs

Motes

Characteristics
Externally powered
No MCU/OS
Externally managed memory
Minimal network interoperability
Tags do not pull data
Externally powered
Short power cycles
Have an MCU
Could run an OS
Self-managed memory
Networking through BAT
Tags can pull data
Battery powered
Long power cycles
Have an MCU
Run an OS
Self-managed memory
Various IP stacks
Nodes can pull data

Deployments
Inventorying applications
Inexpensive
Low maintenance
Long term
Physically accessible or inaccessible
Star-like topology
Sensor networks
Payment tokens
Inexpensive
Low maintenance
Long term
Physically accessible or inaccessible
Complex topologies
Sensor networks
More expensive
Higher maintenance
Shorter term
Physically accessible
Complex topologies

Table 5.1. CRFIDs differ from supply-chain tags in that CRFIDs can manage their
own memory and application logic. CRFIDs also differ from motes in that CRFIDs
have shorter power cycles and depend on RFID readers for power and communication.

tions for tags that can manage their own memory and application logic, but
depend on relays for power and communication. This networking stack allows
computational RFIDs to send and receive messages to and from systems across
the Internet to implement a variety of applications.
2. System: This chapter describes the results of implementing BAT using a UMass
Moo [148] and software radio [5]. It demonstrates that a networking stack for
CRFIDs using untrusted relays may be implemented while adding marginal
computational cost for providing secrecy and integrity. Prior work implicitly
assumes that RFID-scale devices adhere to a model in which tags gather data
that is collected by a trusted reader and tags do not act as independent systems.
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Figure 5.1. BAT Overview: Relays collect packetized messages from tags and forward them through other relays, which deliver them. Packets are split into frames
locally to maximize throughput.

3. Key Management: This chapter shows that identity based key agreements such
as the the non-interactive Sakai, Ohgishi, and Kasahara (SOK) [132] key agreement are feasible on CRFIDs. This is one of the first works that implements a
key agreement suitable for RFID-scale systems that does not require the on-line
verification of a public key during a key agreement.

5.2

Anything-to-Tag Communication

The prevailing protocol for supply-chain RFID systems, EPC Class 1 Gen 2 [55], is
designed around the abstraction of RFID tags as remotely addressable memory. The
Gen 2 commands a reader may use fall into two categories. Readers use singulation
commands to search a tag population for a single tag; then they may issue memory
access commands to read or write its protocol-defined memory banks.
The tags-as-memory abstraction is entirely appropriate for supply-chain applications, but it imposes several hindrances on applications running on CRFIDs. First,
it restricts communications to those that can be formulated in terms of reader-to-tag
memory access commands and simple tag responses. It is possible to reuse fields of existing commands to carry information—for instance, the Gen 2 write command takes
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an arbitrarily long WordPtr parameter intended to specify where to start writing—
but reader support for embedding arbitrary data in these fields varies. Second, the
tags-as-memory abstraction as implemented in Gen 2 readers lacks the notion of a
shared device-address space, so it cannot express useful mainstream networking concepts such as multicast, anycast, or peer-to-peer (tag-to-tag) communication. Finally,
it offers no facility for rich tag messages. Tags respond to most commands with short
fixed-length status messages and to read commands with the requested data. Tags
cannot address messages to other tags.
In contrast to Gen 2, BAT comprises a set of abstractions designed to enable
anything-to-tag communication, in which multiple tags can communicate with one
another and with external entities such as Internet resources. Figure 5.1 depicts BAT
at a block level.
BAT’s increased flexibility and efficiency in comparison to Gen 2 result from several key distinctions. In terms of flexibility, tags are addressable network nodes rather
than simple memory stores. Each tag and each relay has an address in a shared address space. In addition, tags and relays formulate their communications as explicitly
addressed messages (packets) rather than implicitly addressed responses. Finally,
BAT enables confidential tag-to-tag communication via untrusted relays.
In terms of efficiency, BAT conceptually replaces supply-chain RFID readers with
BAT relays that maintain message queues. As in an IP network, interactions between
relays and tags consist mainly of packet-exchange commands. Also, tags and relays
negotiate message sizes to adapt to lower- or higher-quality links. Messages from tags
and relays have the same message format; a relay can forward messages to other tags
without altering them.
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Figure 5.2. Hardware used to implement BAT. The relay (foreground) is a USRP
with RFX900 daughterboards driven by GNU Radio. The UMass Moo (background)
is a CRFID tag derived from the DL WISP 4.1 [135].

5.3

BAT Design Overview

BAT’s basic model consists of relays that move into the vicinity of tags and offer
to provide power and communication. Messages follow a path conceptually similar to
mail in the U.S. postal system: items to be delivered are picked up at their sources
(BAT tags) by mail carriers (BAT relays), routed through the postal system (powered networks of BAT relays), and delivered by local carriers (BAT relays) to their
destinations (BAT tags).
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Figure 5.3. Gen 2 requires messages to achieve singulation before Read/Write commands are issued. In order to implement custom round-trip messages as in BAT
(R → T , T → R), a Write command would have to be followed by a Read command.

A BAT system comprises a set of CRFID tags, all of which are programmed
initially by a trusted tag programmer, and a set of interchangeable relays that understand common frame and packet formats. A relay is a powered device akin to the
RFID readers used in supply-chain applications. It powers tags by transmitting RF
energy and can exchange messages with them via BAT’s link layer. Multiple relays
may be connected to a centralized application controller that knows the network’s
topology and can coordinate message routing; relays may also independently query
their surroundings for tags for which they have messages. The organization and operation of relays is application-dependent. Figure 5.5 summarizes a BAT interaction
between a relay and a tag.
Experimental results demonstrate the benefits of BAT’s packet-framing and framesize-negotiation mechanisms. When there is a high-quality link between relays and
tags, larger frame sizes may result in higher throughput (§5.5). However, when the
link is lossy or noisy, frame sizes must be smaller in order to achieve sustained communication.
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Destination
6 bytes

IV
2 bytes

Data Length
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Data
variable size

MAC
4 bytes

BAT Packet (variable size)

Frame #1

Frame #2

Frame #3

...

Frame #4

Payload
variable size

Counter
4 bits

Frame #n

ID
4 bits

BAT Frame

Figure 5.4. The framed packet format accommodates up to 28 = 256 bytes of data
payload per packet by breaking packets into one or more frames of variable size.

The packet format depends on the higher network layers that are used above BAT.
In this prototype implementation, we chose to follow a format similar to that proposed
by Karlof et al. for sensor networks [89]. Another option could be 6LoWPAN [110]. A
packet is split into frames as illustrated in Figure 5.4. A frame includes a group ID, a
frame-counter, and the payload. All frames with the same group ID are concatenated
sequentially. The frame-counter gives the position of the frame within the packet.
Once all frames are concatenated, the IV together with the source and destination
fields provide a unique packet identifier. The source and destination fields consist of
an ID, a group and a specified domain in order to facilitate routing: when a tag A
has a message for a tag B, A sends the message addressed to B’s ID at the specified
domain. Then, B retrieves messages addressed to it opportunistically. When a tag
A wants to send a message to a particular group of tags in the local domain, it can
simply post a message to the given group at the local domain. BAT implements the
retrieval and collection of messages in a given domain, and the network layer routes
and delivers messages between domains.
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Figure 5.5. BAT messages. A tag may request a relay to: deliver a message, provide
power, or check for messages addressed to the tag. In some cases singulation may be
necessary, but not always.

In order to facilitate the use of untrusted readers, BAT encrypts message payloads.
A per-packet message authentication code (MAC) allows the recipient to detect tampering or transmission errors upon receipt of a packet (§5.6).

5.4

Applications

BAT’s abstractions are more closely matched to conventional networking abstractions than those of Gen 2, and they consequently enable a variety of functions. For
example, multiple tags that need to collaborate toward a larger goal, such as collective time synchronization, can exchange messages with relays and tags to reach
consensus using Paxos [96]. Tag-to-tag messaging could also enable tags to solve optimization problems collectively with ant algorithms, biologically inspired algorithms
that harness the power of collective behavior in solving complex problems using simple agents [109]. Ants are known to collectively compute the shortest path between
their nest and a source of food by each depositing a certain amount of pheromone
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on their paths while walking, attracting other ants to follow the same path. Similar
mechanisms can be generalized to allow swarm agents to solve problems collectively,
such as the traveling salesman problem [46]. The coordinated action of multiple independent agents has also been studied as amorphous computing [11], inspired by
metaphors in biology and physics.
Some applications for CRFID networks, such as those listed below, could benefit
from a network stack that provides secrecy and integrity. The feasibility of using these
tags to compute an aggregate in a privacy-preserving manner is also considered (§6).

5.4.1

Infrastructure Monitoring

Infrastructure monitoring is currently a time-consuming and largely manual task.
Many infrastructure elements are only subjected to periodic spot checks that allow
engineers to gauge the overall condition, but this type of information is not always
sufficient. The collapse of the Mississippi River Bridge in Minnesota, which killed 13
people, is one striking example of this problem. While a 2005 inspection rated the
bridge as “structurally deficient,” repairs were delayed while other bridges thought
to be in worse condition were fixed [143].
A persistent sensor network deployment offers a seemingly simple solution to this
problem. With constant, automated monitoring, sudden changes in infrastructure
condition could be detected and addressed quickly. Unfortunately, deploying wireless
sensors that each operate on a battery introduces a new maintenance problem. Every
monitoring point on the infrastructure will require battery replacement eventually.
One way of shielding sensors from the environment would be to actually embed them
in concrete at the time of construction, but the need to replace batteries precludes
the possibility of embedded deployments.
CRFIDs using BAT could support fine-grained sensing without the need for regular maintenance, as they forgo batteries. The most straightforward approach would
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Figure 5.6. Bridge with a monitoring system in Flint, MI. Data is collected and
transmitted to a remote computer once per hour. System and photo by Fondriest
Environmental [60].
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be for users to collect data about a structure’s condition by moving along the infrastructure with a relay, collecting data from individual tags. A more versatile system
could be constructed by leveraging the tag-to-tag communications enabled by BAT.
In this model, tags could exchange encrypted data among themselves and privately
aggregate the data for general release. This approach would allow the tags themselves
to enforce data-release policies. Any relay could query a tag and get a generic reply,
such as an overall safety rating, but could not determine which tag sensed faults or
the exact nature of those faults. Only trusted relays could elicit detailed reports
indicating which tags have sensed structural weaknesses and what the exact sensor
readings were. In this way, the public could have visibility into infrastructure state,
but saboteurs interested in destroying infrastructure would still be prevented from
gaining any sensitive information. To be more specific, we could use BAT to implement the protocol proposed by Shi et al. [140], which allows untrusted aggregators to
compute privacy-preserving aggregation using data generated by CRFID tags (§6).

5.4.2

Body Area Networks.

BAT could benefit Body Area Networks (BANs) by allowing implanted sensors
and actuators to intercommunicate via an untrusted relay, rather than expending
their limited battery reserves to communicate with one another directly. Currently,
implantable medical devices, such as pacemakers, leverage the same non-rechargeable
battery responsible for lifesaving operations to communicate with device programmers. Replacing the battery in an implantable device requires the surgical replacement of the whole device, so reducing the load on the battery is a major goal for
implantable medical devices [75].
A glucose monitor and injection system for diabetics is one example of a nonimplantable BAN device that could benefit from CRFIDs using BAT. Rather than
using a single large, heavy piece of hardware to sense, report, and inject insulin, it
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would be desirable to decompose the system into smaller, discrete sensor and actuator devices. A CRFID could serve as the insulin sensor, allowing for more discrete
placement. The sensor could continuously report readings to a mobile phone capable
of presenting them to the user in a digestible manner. The phone would also act
as a router, triggering the discrete insulin pump to deliver medication when necessary. While battery-powered sensors also allow the glucose monitoring system to be
decomposed in this manner, creating two devices that require batteries exacerbates
the issue of battery replacement. CRFIDs running BAT would allow the lightweight,
flexible decomposition of this BAN device.
BAT can provide both confidentiality and integrity for BANs, but, depending on
the application requirements, confidentiality may be optional. When the functions
performed by the tags are vital, confidentiality may be a priority. In some situations,
however, the relay could also display information to the user, such as readings from
one of the sensors. BAT can also support this model, which could allow partially
trusted relays to decrypt packets, but not to create packets that can be successfully
verified by a tag.

5.4.3

Roadway Monitoring

Real-time data on road safety can prevent many accidents. Approaching cars
could be alerted of a dangerous pothole or piece of detritus on the highway so that
drivers have the opportunity to react appropriately. The standard monitoring technique for road safety is a combination of opportunistic checks by municipal workers
and notifications from the public. When those responsible for maintaining roads eventually become aware of problems, drivers must wait until a worker can be dispatched
to put up a warning sign before they are finally notified of obstacles in advance.
A network of CRFIDs using BAT could provide real-time data directly to passing
vehicles and also report conditions to the local highway department or other respon-
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sible parties. Tags embedded directly in the roadway could monitor road conditions
via vibration sensors, for example, and report data to passing vehicles without any
human intervention. The passing vehicles would provide the tags with both power
and routing. Vehicles could also send notifications back to tags as they move along
the road to propagate warnings along the roadway so that future vehicles receive earlier warnings. This would allow the tags to not only notify drivers of obstacles, but
to forward messages back to a trusted endpoint like the local highway department.
The opportunistic use of vehicles as routers would obviate the need for a large and
expensive deployment of dedicated RFID relays to act as routers.
While road condition information is not generally considered private, authentication and integrity would be necessary for this application. Without both properties,
malicious parties could falsify packets to overload the network or misdirect drivers
and repair workers. BAT’s use of CMAC to ensure integrity guarantees that adversaries cannot forge arbitrary messages. Because BAT uses keys shared only by a pair
of tags, a receiver tag would be able to verify that the message received was sent
by one other tag. The identity based key exchange allows for the specification of an
expiration date.

5.5

BAT Evaluation

The practicality of BAT is evaluated via a prototype implementation using a
UMass Moo. The implementation shows that BAT’s networking abstractions do
not add significant communication overhead in comparison to supply-chain RFID
networking, and BAT’s mechanisms to enable the negotiation of optimal frame size
generally result in an increased bidirectional throughput.

67

Figure 5.7. Roadway monitoring via video cameras [141]. The use of CRFIDs could
allow for the monitoring of larger areas with less maintenance and infrastructure than
video monitoring.

5.5.1

Prototype Implementation

The relay implementation uses the GNU Radio software-defined radio platform to
drive Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) hardware [5, 57]. This hardware
and software combination allows complete specification of message structure in both
directions. It builds upon Buettner’s RFID reader implementation [26]. Tags are
implemented using the UMass Moo [148], see Figure 5.2. This prototype has an
MSP430F2618 with 8 KB of RAM and a maximum operating frequency of 4 MHz
under harvested power. The tag prototype fixes some transmission options to specific
values for simplicity of implementation; in particular, it uses phase-reversal amplitude
shift keying (PR-ASK) modulation with pulse interval encoding (PIE) from relay to
tag, and phase-shift keying (PSK) modulation with Miller-4 encoding from tag to
relay. Tags are implemented so that facilitation of power requests and rate adaptation
are transparent to applications; individual applications on tags do not need to be
aware of physical conditions or power budgets.
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5.5.2

BAT’s Throughput

BAT negotiates optimal frame size at the beginning of an interaction to maximize
throughput. When a tag needs to receive more than a few bytes of data on a regular
basis, using a fixed, conservative frame size adds significant overhead. The optimal
frame size may vary considerably depending on operating conditions, the tag’s internal
memory speed, or the particular combination of reader and tag. Experiments show
that the throughput increases linearly with the frame size to achieve the highest
throughput of 18 Kbps with a frame size of 112 bytes. With larger frame sizes, the
error rate increases, and, therefore, the goodput decreases. Figure 5.8 illustrates the
average throughput for this prototype using BAT when sending data split into frames
of various sizes.
Because there is not yet a wide variety of CRFID prototypes, one can use highcapacity Gen 2 tags and readers to further illustrate the need for variable frame sizes.
In this experiment, the payload of the Gen 2 BlockWrite command carries data from a
reader to a tag. Two commercial tags were used: the Xerafy Sky-ID and the Ramtron
MaxArias, which can store up to 8 KB and 2 KB of user data respectively. The size
of the payload was varied and the throughput was recorded. The readers in the
experiment are the ThingMagic reader M5e and a Ramtron MaxReader Development
Kit.
When using the User memory bank of the Xerafy Sky-ID, the number of BlockWrite commands necessary to fully write the payload value increases linearly with
frame size, except when the tag is placed less than 3 mm from the reader’s antenna.
In order to achieve a high successful-write rate, a BlockWrite command should carry
at most 4 bytes of data. MaxArias tags would achieve the best throughput when
using BlockWrite commands with 56 bytes of data at a time. In order to implement
BAT-style communication atop Gen 2, a BlockWrite command would have to be fol-
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Figure 5.8. The throughput of BAT depends on the size of frames. Shorter frames
result in an increased number of round trips, overhead in frame responses, and interframe processing. Larger frames are more likely to result in a corrupted frame. The
figure shows the average throughput accounting for retransmissions using different
frame sizes. The maximum throughput observed in the current prototype is 18 Kbps,
achieved when using a 112-byte frame. Larger frames significantly reduce throughput
due to larger error rates. BAT uses Tari = 13 µs. Frame size does not significantly
affect throughput when a Gen 2 M5e reader is used with two different Gen 2 highcapacity tags because of their low success rate—the number of attempts required for
a write increases proportionally with the frame size. The M5e reader uses Tari =
12.5 µs. Tags are placed approximately an inch from the antenna.

lowed by a Read command (with ∼ 4 bytes of data) in order to allow a tag to reply
with a non-Gen 2 protocol response as illustrated in Figure 5.3.
BAT’s abstractions do not add a communication overhead. Its frame-size negotiation happens only once per transmission and its overhead is approximately 50 ms,
roughly the time it takes to perform a Gen 2 read. Gen 2 does not negotiate optimal
frame size, but there is still some overhead associated with transmission, as illustrated
in Figure 5.3. For example, Gen 2 requires tag singulation because it is meant to be
used in tag-dense environments. However, BAT may or may not need this singulation.
Gen 2’s overhead typically involves three initiating messages before each command is
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sent to a tag. In addition, Gen 2 Read and BlockWrite commands have fields that are
unnecessary from the standpoint of a protocol designed to facilitate anything-to-tag
communication.
The throughput of BAT will likely scale with improvements in prototypes and the
physical layer. For example, one of the parameters of the physical layer, the Tari
(the time interval to encode a bit in the R → T direction), significantly impacts
throughput. In experiments, no errors were found when the Tari was greater or equal
to 13 µs. When Tari was equal to 11 µs, only 2 of 100 128-bit frames contained no
errors. In this case, errors consisted of missed bits and not bit flips. When Tari
was less than 11 µs, all frames had missed bits and flipped bits. The limiting factor
hindering communication with Tari values smaller than 13 µs is the MCU in the
UMass Moo. The MSP430F2618 in the UMass Moo can process an interrupt no
more than every 7 µs regardless of the operating clock speed, and the time required
to process the input is around 5 µs. The demodulator, however, supports higher rates.
In contrast, other non-CRFID tags such as the MaxArias use a 6 µs Tari.

5.6

Using Untrusted Relays

CRFIDs are well-suited for network applications that require long-term deployments because of their low maintenance requirements. In many cases it may be
important to provide message secrecy and integrity for such deployments (§5.2). The
ability to use untrusted relays for message routing minimizes the size of the trusted
computing base and simplifies key management problems. Untrusted relays are only
required to understand how to route packets in the network.
In order to support the use of untrusted relays, BAT encrypts packet payloads
using AES. To ensure packet integrity, each packet includes a 32-bit message authentication code (MAC) to prevent tampering. Karlof et al. [89] provide arguments for
the sufficiency of this MAC size for sensor network applications. Preliminary results
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Operation

Cycles

Time
(calculated)
AES-128 setup
144,677 36.1 ms
AES-128 enc (per block) 7,795
1.9 ms
AES-128 dec (per block) 8,003
2.0 ms
CMAC (AES-128 80 B) 39,669 9.9 ms
Table 5.2. The cycle count for each security operation was measured using a hardware debugger and a UMass Moo. The reported time is calculated assuming a typical
sending clock speed of 4 MHz.

show that CRFID prototypes are capable of performing state-of-the-art cryptographic
operations to support encrypted communication at the link layer. The most expensive
operations correspond to the public-key cryptography necessary when shared keys are
not distributed in advance. Once these keys have been established, providing secrecy
and integrity is relatively inexpensive, as shown in Table 5.2. Opportunistic encryption allows for 61 Kbps of throughput, higher than the maximum 18 Kbps link speed
achieved in experiments. Once a shared key has been constructed, tags must encrypt
the packet payload using a symmetric block cipher (AES-128) and then calculate a
MAC (we use CMAC [53]) over an initialization vector (IV) and ciphertext. This sort
of computation is also possible because BAT allows tags to request additional power
to encrypt/decrypt as needed.

5.6.1

Performance on Future CRFID Prototypes

The ratio of the computational performance of cryptographic operations over the
overall throughput of BAT’s communication will continue to decrease with improved
microcontroller capabilities, such as power-efficiency and higher clock-speeds. This
implementation was based on a current CRFID prototype with an MSP430F2618
microcontroller, the UMass Moo [148]. In the near future, we may see other CRFID
prototypes with ARM microcontrollers or other MSP430 microcontrollers with higher
clock speeds, which will enhance the performance of BAT’s cryptographic operations.
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There are MCUs in the MSP430F5xx series that would allow a CRFID to operate
at 8 MHz using harvested energy or at a maximum of 25 MHz using an alternative
source of energy. There are also several MCUs in the ARM Cortex-M0 and ARM
Cortex-M0+ families that are even more power-efficient than MCUs in the MSP430
family, while providing higher clock speeds. For example, the ARM Cortex-M0+
may consume as little as 11.2 µW/MHz compared to 803 µW/MHz consumed by the
MSP430F2618. An ARM Cortex-M0 may consume 16 µW/MHz in its lowest-power
setting. Table 5.3 forecasts BAT’s performance on these MCUs.
Primitive

MCU

Clock Freq.

AES Setup
AES Setup
AES Setup
AES Enc
AES Enc
AES Enc
AES Dec
AES Dec
AES Dec

MSP43F5310
Cortex-M0+
Cortex-M0
MSP43F5310
Cortex-M0+
Cortex-M0
MSP43F5310
Cortex-M0+
Cortex-M0

8 MHz
30 MHz
50 MHz
8 MHz
30 MHz
50 MHz
8 MHz
30 MHz
50 MHz

Time
(calculated)
18 ms
1.2 ms
0.7 ms
978 µ s
74 µ s
44 µ s
1004 µ s
80 µ s
48 µ s

Table 5.3. Computation times for cryptographic operations on the following MCUs:
(1) MSP430F5310 @ 8 MHz; (2) ARM Cortex-M0+ @ 30 MHz; (3) ARM Cortex-M0
@ 50 MHz.

5.6.2

Shared-Key Generation

Shared-key generation is the most expensive security operation required by BAT.
However, micro-benchmarks show that identity-based key agreements are feasible on
CRFID tags. The Smart-Chen-Kudla (SCK) key agreement [36] is less computationally expensive than a traditional Diffie-Hellman (DH) approach. However, the noninteractive Sakai, Ohgishi, and Kasahara (SOK) construction [132] is only marginally
more expensive than DH.
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Identity-based key-agreement schemes allow for the creation of private–public key
pairs, such that the public key is an arbitrary string and only a trusted entity—a
private-key generator (PKG)—can compute the corresponding private key. Thus, for
example, it would be easy for a tag to encrypt a message so that only a tag with serial
number x could obtain the corresponding decryption key from the PKG. Additionally,
the sending tag can include an expiration time in its public key. SOK key exchange is
also desirable because DH is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks unless a third
party authenticates protocol participants. This limitation is usually addressed by the
addition of a Certificate Authority (CA), but key management is difficult in CA-based
systems [58]. Table 5.4 lists the times necessary to compute a shared key using the
approaches described above and the elliptic curve pairing implementations by the
Miracl Crypto SDK [32].
Key Agreement

Security

Diffie-Hellman
Diffie-Hellman
Diffie-Hellman
ECC Diffie-Hellman
SOK with Type-1
SOK with Type-1

2048-bit
1024-bit
640-bit
∼ DL 1024-bit
∼ DL 1024-bit
∼ DL 640-bit

Time
(calculated)
208 s
50 s
21 s
27 s
53 s
30 s

Table 5.4. Computation times for key agreements on the MSP430F2618 @ 4 MHz.
All multi-precision arithmetic, EC arithmetic, and pairings are implemented by Miracl [32]. The Diffie-Hellman key exchange based on the ECDLP uses the NIST curve
P-192. The Type-1 pairings use supersingular curves E(Fp ) for a 512-bit prime and
E(F2379 ).

It should be noted that tags must be re-keyed periodically for revocation of expired
devices. In a solution without certificates, like the one discussed in this chapter, the
public key of a tag may be an arbitrary string. This is one important simplification
that comes from using identity-based encryption. Therefore, when a tag A wants to
talk to a tag B, there is no need for tag B to request the verification of the public
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key of tag A. Despite this advantage, identity based key agreements still require that
a trusted authority distributes private keys. There are elegant solutions based on
hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) that allow for the implementation of
this re-keying process in a distributed fashion [64]. The discussion of these schemes
is outside of the scope of this chapter. Obtaining private keys and computing shared
keys for pairwise communication is relatively expensive. A tag must be provided with
power for tk ≈ 53 seconds to generate one of these shared keys. However, a traditional
approach is not considerably less expensive. If the number of tags |T| is small, tags
can also be instructed to precompute every pairwise key they can use to communicate
with other tags.

5.7

Related Work

Networks of RFID tags [24] or CRFIDs have been of interest in the last few years,
and other authors have proposed applications including building instrumentation [147]
and user activity inference [25]. This past work assumes that tags are not capable
of communicating with one another and that the network is actually composed of
readers that report data to a central database where all computations occur. Other
work has focused on enhancing supply-chain RFID-style backscattering. For example,
Wang et al. [146] describe how to reduce singulation overhead by allowing multiple
tags to communicate simultaneously in spite of collisions.
Reynolds has suggested the use of semi-passive tags capable of intercommunication, but these tags abandon backscatter in favor of traditional radio technology, so the
network model is much different from that in this chapter [125]. Application-specific
communication between backscattering RFID tags has been explored previously by
Juels [86]. Nikitin et al. [114] propose tag-to-tag communication by allowing passive
tags to listen to one another’s transmissions. Their approach is restricted by requiring close proximity. BAT could be implemented atop this physical layer to improve
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throughput. CCCP [133] supports tag-to-tag communication of a sort, but it is limited to storage and retrieval of data from a single tag to an untrusted reader. It does
not give tags the ability to exchange data.

5.8

Conclusion

BAT allows CRFIDs to communicate with computer systems as well as other tags
using relays that can be easily replaced and do not need to be aware of application information. A preliminary implementation demonstrates that BAT’s abstractions are
better suited for RFID-scale sensor networks than communication protocols designed
for supply-chain tags because it eliminates the need for relays to manage tags’ internal
memory and facilitates bidirectional communication that treats the up-link and the
down-link with equal priority. Micro-benchmarks show that offering a secure network
layer that uses untrusted relays to exchange information does not add a significant
overhead, which is attractive for applications that require tags to be left exposed and
unattended.
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CHAPTER 6
PRIVACY-PRESERVING AGGREGATION USING
CONSTRAINED DEVICES

This chapter explores the problem of performing distributed privacy-preserving
aggregation using constrained devices. In applications such as infrastructure monitoring, it may be beneficial to allow an untrusted entity to learn an aggregate value
without revealing the individual entries that contributed to the aggregate. A traditional way of allowing an untrusted party to learn these aggregates is through a
trusted aggregator that does not expose the individual entries. In some cases, such
as in the event of a disaster, it may be important not to rely on a trusted aggregator.
The model of aggregation presented here, initially developed by Shi et al. [140]
for large-scale systems, does not require a trusted aggregator. To achieve distributed
differential privacy, a set of devices coordinates to collectively perturbate the output
of an aggregation. This chapter shows that Shi et al.’s cryptographic construction for
achieving distributed differential privacy is feasible using computational RFID devices
by implementing it on a UMass Moo. It also discusses limitations of extensions of
Shi et al.’s model designed to provide fault tolerance [33]. A Moo needs to make
a 17 s computation to contribute to an aggregate. However, if fault tolerance is
implemented, a Moo needs to perform a 2-minute calculation when 100 other devices
are involved or a 4-minute calculation when 10,000 other devices are involved.

6.1

Contribution

This chapter demonstrates the feasibility of distributed CRFID systems for the
collective computation of aggregates without relying on a trusted aggregator. This
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chapter presents the implementation of Shi et al.’s [140] protocol on a CRFID prototype and describes the limitations of techniques in current CRFIDs that allow fault
tolerance. The computational overhead of one such approach by Chan et al. [33]
is estimated. These results provide a basis for measuring the performance of new
distributed privacy-preserving systems for CRFIDs that do not require a trusted aggregator. Prior work in this area has restricted attention to implementations on
full-fledged computer systems.

6.2

Privacy-Preserving Aggregation with an Oblivious Aggregator

In the example discussed earlier (§5), a bridge may be monitored by a series
of devices equipped with sensors such as vibration, temperature, pressure or other
sensors. While a typical approach for data collection in this example involves a
centralized entity that collects data and analyzes it, in some situations, it could be
desirable that non-trusted entities be able to query the system to obtain aggregate
information without going through the centralized entity. For instance, the link to
the centralized entity may not exist—e.g. in the case of a disaster area or a battle
zone—or it may be useful to allow the public to verify the condition of bridges and
request that a particular one be serviced because the aggregate shows that the bridge
is not structurally sound. In either situation, it may be important to protect the
individual entries of an aggregation. These could expose details about a vulnerability
that should not be made public.
Another example that may need the kind of privacy-preserving aggregation discussed here is untrusted inventory inspections. For example, when dealing with pharmaceutical shipments, it may be important to know that no more than a certain
percentage of medications has been exposed to undesirable conditions. An untrusted
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inspector should not be able to gain any knowledge about the specific inventory of a
shipment.

6.3

A Mechanism for Privacy-Preserving Aggregation

Let us consider the problem of computing a sum

Pn

i=1

xi over n values from n

client devices while providing differential privacy. A solution to this problem was
proposed by Shi et al. [140]. Their general technique is illustrated in Figure 6.1, and
the assumptions for the simpler case are described below.

6.3.1

Simple Model Assumptions

Listed below are Shi et al.’s assumptions for a distributed system that enables
the computation of sums using data from multiple clients. Each client is assumed
to have a device that contains data that belongs to the client and that is under his
or her control. Subsequently, possible ways to relax some of these assumptions are
discussed.
The problem is to compute a sum

Pn

i=1

xi over n values, each the result of com-

puting a statistical query over data that resides on each client’s device. Clients are
semi-honest, but they do not trust others with their data; thus, they would like to
be guaranteed differential privacy. While clients may want to participate in the collaborative computation of a sum that includes their data, they do not wish to reveal
their individual values. They are not expected to falsely report information or willingly avoid participation. In particular, they are assumed to always respond when
queried by a designated aggregator. However, clients may collude with the aggregator
by revealing their individual values. The designated aggregator is oblivious, and it
is assumed to have access to auxiliary information. The aggregator adheres to the
protocol and is trusted to learn the answer to the sum, but not the individual entries
from each client’s device. Aggregators may gain additional knowledge because they
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may have other means of knowing particular individuals’ values or because they have
access to a related database. Clients and aggregators that participate in the protocol
have previously obtained their private keys from a trusted entity. It is assumed that
there is no churn. That is, there are no dynamic joins or leaves. All participants are
known beforehand, and they all need to participate in order to successfully compute
a sum. Finally, note that the model does not address security properties related to
availability. It is assumed that there is always a communication channel between the
aggregator and each of the devices.
Individual
Device
1

Individual
Device
2

E(sk2 , x2 + r2 )

Individual
Device E(sk3 , x3 + r3 )
3

E(sk1 , x1 + r1 )
n
X

Combine
sub-aggregates

Individual
Device E(sk4 , x4 + r4 )
4
E(skn 1 , xn 1 + rn 1 )

...

Individual
Device
n-1

x i + ri

i=1

E(skn , xn + rn )
Individual
Device
n

Figure 6.1. Computing a sum via a distributed model to achieve differential privacy.

6.3.2

Basic Construction

Shi et al.’s basic construction can be described as follows. The reader is referred
to [140] for additional details, proofs of security, and bounds on utility. Given G
a cyclic group of prime order p for which the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption holds, and H : Z → G a hash function modeled as a random oracle, the
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computation of the aggregate takes place in three steps. First, in a setup step, a
trusted dealer selects a public parameter and encryption keys for each of the participants and the aggregator. Then, each of the participants uses the public parameter
and his or her key to encrypt his or her individual value previously perturbed with
some noise drawn from a geometric distribution. Finally, when an aggregator receives
all the encrypted pieces, he or she combines them to obtain the final aggregate without obtaining the individual contributions in the process. More explicitly the three
steps correspond to the following three procedures:
1. Setup(1λ ): The trusted dealer selects a generator g ∈R G as a public parameter
P
and secret keys sk0 , sk1 , . . . , skn ∈R Zp such that ni=0 ski = 0. sk0 is the secret
key for the aggregator, and ski is the secret key for participant i.

2. N oisyEnc(g, ski , t, x̂i ): At each time step t, the participant i with value xi adds
noise ri from a geometric distribution, such that x̂i = xi + ri mod p. Then the
participant computes ci = g xˆi · H(t)ski .
3. AggrDec(g, sk0 , t, c1 , . . . , cn ). The aggregator computes V = H(t)sk0
and then S, the discrete log of V base g.
Note that V =
and therefore S =

Qn

i=0

Pn

i=1

Qn

i=1 ci

Pn
 Pn
P
H(t)ski g i=1 xˆi and because ni=0 ski = 0 then V = g i=1 xˆi

x̂i .

To provide (ε, δ)-differential privacy, the noise ri is chosen as follows:

ri =

Where α = exp( δε ), β =

1
n



 Geom(α) with probability β;

 0

with probability 1 − β.

log 1δ , and Geom(α) is the symmetric geometric distribution

that takes integer values such that the probability mass function for the support k is
α−1
·α|k| .
α+1

Therefore, when V is decrypted, the resulting value will contain roughly one
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copy of geometric noise in addition to the aggregate in order to achieve differential
privacy. The proof that this scheme is computationally (ε, δ)-differentially private
against compromised users can be found in Shi et al.’s paper [140]. Also note that
the communication is O(n), the total computation for a client is O(1), and the error
in the aggregate is also O(1).

6.4

Implementation Using RFID-Scale Devices

The feasibility of implementing a distributed system to perform privacy-preserving
aggregation of time-series of data using RFID-scale devices is explored here. The
approach applies the system proposed by Shi et al. [140], which is then used by Chan
et al. [33] as a building block for an alternate construction that allows for dynamic
node joins and leaves.
As described above, in Shi et al.’s basic construction, each participant’s device
needs to compute a hash, two modular exponentiations, and a multiplication in a
Diffie-Hellman group. Decrypting the aggregate using this construction requires the
computation of a dilogarithm, and therefore, significantly more computational power.
Thus this chapter shows that this model can be realized even when the individual
devices are constrained, provided that the aggregator is sufficiently powerful.

6.4.1

Implementation Details

An implementation of the cryptographic algorithms with the UMass Moo [148]
is used to evaluate the feasibility of implementing a system such as Shi et al.’s with
RFID-scale devices. This CRFID prototype has an MSP430F2618 microcontroller
unit with 8KB of RAM and runs at 4 MHz using harvested power and up to 16 MHz
using an additional source of power, such as a solar panel or a vibration harvester.
The implementation of Shi et al.’s basic algorithms uses the Miracl [32] library
for multi-precision arithmetic and elliptic curve arithmetic. The code was compiled
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using the IAR Embedded Workbench for TI MSP430 [6] version 5.40.7 for measuring
running times, memory footprint, and code size. Miracl was configured to use static
memory allocation, i.e. functions such as malloc were not used in this implementation.
The code is in C and does not use assembly optimizations.
For comparison, six DH groups were used: DH G1 is a classic Diffie-Hellman group
with a 640-bit prime; DH G2 is a classic Diffie-Hellman group with a 1024-bit prime;
and EC G3 , G4 , G5 , G6 are the elliptic curve groups associated to the NIST curves
P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384 respectively [23].
The implementation was also integrated in Contiki [48] to explore issues of integration with an RTOS and a micro database such as Antelope [144]. Some of the
issues considered are RAM utilization and additional code size. This integration was
evaluated using Cooja [115], a Java based simulator for MSP430 devices.

6.4.2

Measurements
Group

Comparable
Strength

Cycles

DH G1
DH G2
EC G3
EC G4
EC G5
EC G6

–
SKIPJACK
SKIPJACK
Triple-DES
AES-128
AES-192

13,4225,440
333,209,546
67,849,396
89,254,793
115,877,960
244,316,066

Time
Time
RAM
(calculated) (calculated)
@ 4Mhz
@ 16Mhz
33.5 s
8.3 s
3379 B
83.3 s
20.8 s
4675 B
16.9 s
4.2 s
3463 B
22.3 s
5.5 s
3571 B
28.9 s
7.2 s
3679 B
61.0 s
15.2 s
4111 B

Table 6.1. The cycle count for encrypting a noisy value (ci = g xˆi · H(t)ski ) measured
using a hardware debugger and a UMass Moo. The underlying hash function was
derived using SHA256. As a reference, the second column lists a block cipher with
comparable strength based on the key size [112, 23]. The reported time is calculated
assuming a clock speed of 4 MHz, typical when using harvested energy, and 16 MHz,
the maximum when an additional source of power is available. The RAM requirements
do not include the networking stack or any other additional application logic and are
measured using IAR’s IDE and compiler tools V.5.40.7.
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Table 6.1 shows the time it would take a CRFID tag to produce an encrypted
noisy value (§6). As we can see, it is possible to encrypt a noisy value on a Moo in
under 17 s using an acceptable level of security. For higher levels of security, using
classic Diffie-Hellman groups has a prohibitive cost, not only computationally, but the
memory requirements are greater than those of the current UMass Moo prototype.
An implementation for an MSP430 using a classic Diffie-Hellman group with a 2048bit prime requires 13 KB of RAM, more than the 8 KB of RAM of the current UMass
Moo prototype. This total amount of RAM has to be shared with the networking
stack and other application logic.

6.4.3

Additional System Considerations

It is important to note that in addition to being able to generate a noisy encrypted
version of a local query result, a device should be able to store its data locally on
a system that resembles a relational database. One example of such a system for
constrained devices is Antelope [144]. This system allows for the computation of
queries such as:
>> SELECT MEAN(humidity), MAX(humidity) FROM samples
WHERE year = 2010 AND month >= 6 AND month <= 8;
or
>> contacts <- JOIN device, rendezvous ON device_id
PROJECT address, year, mon;
SELECT COUNT(*) FROM contacts WHERE year = 2011 AND mon = 4
AND address = aaaa::1;
It is also necessary to allow some basic multitasking to coordinate communication,
computation, sensing, and possibly actuating. Over the years multiple RTOSes have
been developed for sensor nodes, such as TinyOS [98] or Contiki [48]. Currently,
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there is no operating system with comparable functionality for RFID-scale devices.
Instead multitasking is implemented using finite state machines. Switching between
states happens using timers and interrupts. One reason contributing to the nonexistence of real-time operating systems for RFID-scale devices may be their highly
erratic power cycles. An RTOS suitable for these devices would have to have faster
suspend and resume functionality than RTOSes for battery-powered systems, which
for the most part assume longer power cycles.
With this in mind, it is important to ensure that the code sizes of an RTOS,
database system, and cryptographic implementation do not exceed the total size
of ROM available. The implementation of Shi et al.’s generation of noisy encryptions (§6.4.1) was integrated with Contiki and Antelope to illustrate that the total integration of the system may fit within the 116 KB available for code in an
MSP430F2618. The cryptographic components require approximately 31 KB depending on the DH group selected, and Contiki and Antelope require 4 KB and
17 KB respectively in their minimum configurations. Finally, there needs to be sufficient code space to implement networking and drivers for additional storage (i.e.
external flash). In the case of this prototype, these require under 4 KB; however,
other networking stacks such as ip or ipv6 may have significantly higher code size
requirements.
In practice, a greater challenge is to accommodate RAM requirements. Because
the implementation of the cryptographic components requires approximately 4KB of
RAM and a database system such as Antelope requires just over 4KB of RAM, there
is barely enough room to fit both of these components in the 8 KB of total RAM available. To ameliorate this issue, a custom implementation of the crypto components
was developed from scratch using EC G3 and only including the arithmetic operations
needed to perform arithmetic on the NIST curve P-192 [23]. This implementation
requires approximately 11 KB of code size and approximately 2 KB of RAM.
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6.5

Fault Tolerance

Shi et al.’s basic approach suffers from the requirement that each participant
must take part in the aggregation. It is easy to see that if a single encrypted entry
 P xˆ
Q
ski
ci = g xˆi · H(t)ski is missing, then V 0 =
g i∈S i will not decrypt to the
i∈S H(t)
P
sum i∈S x̂i of all the remaining values.
Chan et al. [33] built on Shi et al.’s basic approach to create a solution that

provides fault tolerance and dynamic joins and leaves by using binary trees. While
this solution may be appealing when using traditional computer systems such as
workstations or servers, it may not always be practical on constrained devices. The
main reason is that a client in this system has to perform O(log n) encryptions rather
than a single encryption. For example, a device needs to perform 14 encryptions when
the number of devices is approximately 10,000 or 7 encryptions when the number of
devices is approximately 100. Thus, in practice, computing a noisy aggregate using
constrained devices such as CRFIDs will require minutes rather than seconds. In
some applications, however, this penalty may be acceptable.

6.5.1

Utility

Shi et al.’s approach produces an answer with an error of size O(1). However,
Chan et al.’s produces an error1 of size Õ((log n)3/2 ) in order to deal with missing
participants [33]. These bounds do not take into account the issue of requiring privacy
budgets for multiple related queries.

6.6

Related Work

Related work in networking and distributed systems has aimed to improve the performance of aggregations. For example, Chen et al [37] propose a system for achieving

1

The authors use the simpler Õ(·) notation to hide a log log n factor and other factors that depend
on the number of failed users and the differential privacy factors.
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distributed differential privacy using the Goldwasser-Micali bit-cryptosystem [67]. In
such a system, encrypting a bit requires a squaring and a multiplication. When the
local answer to a query is small, this encryption system is significantly more efficient.
A drawback of their approach is that they assume the existence of a proxy that is
honest but curious between the analysts and the participants. This proxy controls
which clients participate in a given aggregation. Chen et al. discuss a way to deal
with malicious proxies through the use of trusted hardware, such as Trusted Platform
Modules (TPMs).
Another system that guarantees differential privacy using a distributed model
of a sort is GUPT [104]. However, Mohan et al.’s distributed model has the goal
of achieving parallelism to improve performance without compromising the utility
guarantees. This parallelism also allows for the transparent division into computation
blocks that can be independently calculated. The purpose of this is to enhance
practicality even when programs are not written with privacy in mind. In GUPT the
aggregator is trusted and the private output is the result of computing an answer to
an aggregate and adding Laplacian noise afterwards.
McSherry [103] developed PINQ, a system that provides a programing interface to
perform queries on a database obtaining responses that provide differential privacy.
McSherry shows how to deal with the issue of composing multiple queries and how
this composition affects both utility and privacy. As a result, he develops a privacy
calculus such that an agent sets and verifies the proper differential privacy parameters
for each analyst according to a policy and the various queries made by that agent.

6.7

Conclusion

This chapter shows that techniques to achieve differential privacy can be implemented using CRFIDs, opening the door to a variety of privacy-aware applications.
However, there are important issues that need to be addressed to improve the prac-
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ticality of large deployments. The issue of allowing fault tolerance may require a
considerable number of additional expensive encryptions, which may cross the line
of acceptable performance. Other system aspects that require further development
include the design and implementation of supporting system components such as a
real-time operating system for RFID-scale devices. From the theoretical standpoint, it
is important to develop more practical models that address malicious clients, privacy
budgets, and high utility guarantees without relying on trusted aggregators.
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CHAPTER 7
PRIVACY-PRESERVING AGGREGATION OF MEDICAL
TELEMETRY

Medical devices are increasingly collecting telemetry to monitor patients’ wellbeing as well as device functioning. The collection and storage of this telemetry
are often performed by device manufacturers, who then make aggregate information
available to caregivers. The information gathered from this telemetry could also be
used to study the effectiveness of devices and their reliability. However, a challenge lies
in being able to compute statistical analyses on telemetry from multiple manufacturers
and institutions such that the privacy of individual patients is protected.
An alternative approach is one in which caregivers collect and store telemetry from
medical devices and participate in multi-institutional protocols to perform statistical
analyses [105].1 Homomorphic encryption schemes can be used to facilitate the calculation of statistical functions while preventing the disclosure of individual entries,
thus allowing for the computation of analyses using data from multiple institutions
and manufacturers.
The feasibility of this approach is judged on the basis of how well an analysis
is performed rather than how fast an answer is computed. The rational is that the
computation of a privacy-preserving counting query in a distributed fashion can be
done sufficiently fast when performing an analysis over a period of several weeks.
1

This chapter draws from previously published work: “HICCUPS: Health Information Collaborative Collection Using Privacy and Security” by A. Molina, M. Salajegheh, and K. Fu. In Proceedings
of the ACM Workshop on Security and Privacy in Medical and Home-Care Systems. November 2009.
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This chapter shows that a number of useful statistical analyses may be performed
via this approach, including counting queries, averages, sums, maxima, minima and
linear regressions; which allow for the evaluation of the effectiveness and reliability of
medical devices.

7.1

Contributions

The contributions of this chapter are:
1. Model: This chapter proposes an alternative model that does not rely on device
manufacturers as mediators between the collection of telemetry and analysts. In
the resulting trusted computing base, only caregivers have full access to patients’
data. Because patients in a single institution may have devices from multiple
manufacturers, institutions will be in the position to perform analyses across
manufacturers. Multiple institutions could then collaborate in the computation
of analyses.
2. Design: This chapter designs Health Information Collaborative Collection Using
Privacy and Security (HICCUPS), a system that could allow for the collaborative computation of aggregates across institutions via homomorphic encryption.
3. Definition: This chapter defines a metric for evaluating a system that computes
statistical aggregates while preserving patients’ privacy. A suitable metric for
a system should be based on the utility of analyses rather than the computational overhead required to protect privacy, provided that a computation is
done sufficiently fast.
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7.2

Case for a Distributed Model for Aggregating Medical
Telemetry

Preserving the privacy of aggregated medical data currently focuses on manual
removal of personal information or rigid processing of data by highly trusted information brokers. While such systems can work well on a small scale, drawbacks include
the ad-hoc nature of manual redactions and the placing of power in the hands of a
single entity that could be compromised. An alternative approach to secure aggregation could instead protect the privacy of individuals using a distributed model.
Aggregate information could be used to identify trends and system-wide causes of
disease, procedural mistakes, or device malfunction.

New TCB
Caregiver
Institution

Patients

Researchers
HICCUPS: Andres Molina, Mastooreh Salajegheh, Kevin Fu

8

Figure 7.1. An alternative trust model would place researchers—including device
manufacturers—in a position where they can submit privacy preserving queries. Only
patients and their caregivers have full access to patients’ telemetry.

Medical telemetry generated by home monitoring is an example of an instance in
which patient privacy could be at risk due to current practices that do not limit the
amount of data given to device manufacturers. The trend toward remote monitoring
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Caregiver n

Figure 7.2. Data flow that prevails currently. Patients upload their telemetry to
the manufacturer’s servers, from which it is made available to caregivers for analysis.

allows patients with implanted devices to ensure proper functioning without the inconvenience of having to travel frequently to a clinical office. The current mechanism
employed to make this remote monitoring possible involves sending all of the medical
telemetry directly to the manufacturers, which then make it available to a patient’s
caregiver remotely (Figure 7.4). As of 2012, patients with medical implants such as
implantable cardio-defibrillators and pacemakers do not have access to the information that is collected from their devices and manufacturers treat these data as their
own [29]. There is also no formal infrastructure to allow clinical researchers to gain
access to key pieces of data of a statistical nature.
Solutions such as making it easier for researchers to access de-identified data,
as proposed by Gostin and Nass [113], may still pose unanticipated problems. For
example, Biel et al. [19] show that it is possible to identify an individual in a predetermined group by using ECG data. Moreover, centralized locations that even
briefly have access to unencrypted data create single points of failure where entire
national databases could be compromised by clever hackers or conspiring insiders.
As an alternative, this chapter proposes that both device manufacturers and clinical researchers be able to obtain the information that they need about the data via
computing aggregate functions on encrypted data.
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HICCUPS: Andres Molina, Mastooreh Salajegheh, Kevin Fu
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Figure 7.3. The current trust model requires that a manufacturer gather all patient
data and deliver it to their corresponding caregivers. Patients do not currently have
access to their data.

7.2.1

Medical Implant Reliability Studies

In 2006, cardiologist Dr. William Maisel [100] published a meta analysis of pacemaker and ICD registries to assess the rates of pacemaker and ICD malfunctions in
order to be able to identify trends in the reliability of these devices. Another similar
study also aimed at counting the malfunctions of pacemakers and ICDs examined
data from multiple years included in the annual reports of the Federal Drug Administration of the U.S. [101]. The authors of this study pointed out that the database
registries that monitor the performance of these devices are limited primarily by their
small size or by their voluntary nature. Both of the studies cited above concluded
that ongoing surveillance of pacemaker and ICD performance should be required. A
system like the one described in this chapter could allow institutions such as the
FDA to conduct reports that provide a more detailed aggregation of device malfunctions including device model numbers and types of malfunctions. The data-sets made
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available using this model could be larger, and the aggregation could potentially be
computed more frequently and in an automated way. If manufacturers published their
parameters for identifying a malfunctioning device without extracting them from the
patient, then not only the caregiver, but also the FDA, would be able to react to
reliability or safety issues.

7.2.2

Identifying the Impact of Low Income on Preterm Birth Risk

Developments in the implementation of distributed methods for analysis may go
beyond medical devices. In 2009 the Center for Democracy and Technology in the
U.S. published a document to encourage the use of de-identified and anonymized
health data and to rethink the protection of this data by regulations such as the
HIPAA Privacy Rule [127]. This document notes that one of the common uses for
this kind of data is research. In particular, the document mentions as an example that
de-identified data has been used to perform research on the prevention of premature
births. One such research study, performed by DeFranco et al. studied the effect
of living in a socioeconomically deprived area on the risk of preterm births [41].
In this study, a number of counties in Missouri were identified as being below the
U.S. poverty line based on census information. These counties were then classified
according to various levels of poverty. The number of pregnancies that resulted in
various periods of preterm birth were counted using de-identified records, and the
aggregates were analyzed. The study concluded that above other underlying risk
factors, women residing in socioeconomically deprived areas are at an increased risk
of having a preterm birth. A distributed system for aggregation could help in the
validation or extension of DeFranco et al.’s analysis to regions all over the nation.
Homomorphic encryption could allow researchers to aggregate device malfunctions or
calculate the number of preterm births for women living below the U.S. poverty line
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Figure 7.4. The figure illustrates the data flow that prevails currently. Patients
upload their telemetry to the manufacturer’s servers, from which it is made available
to caregivers for analysis.

in various counties. These aggregates could also be computed for different preterm
birth periods and then analyzed to determine the impact of low income conditions.

7.3

HICCUPS

This section presents Health Information Collaborative Collection Using Privacy
and Security (HICCUPS), a distributed system that uses homomorphic encryption to
allow only caregivers to have unrestricted access to patients’ records and at the same
time enable researchers to compute statistical values and aggregate functions across
different patients and caregivers.

7.3.1

Background on Homomorphic Encryption

Modern cryptography allows for computation on encrypted values through a technique developed in the 1970s known as homomorphic encryption [128], which became
popular in the 1990s for secure tallying of encrypted votes [117, 63]. Algorithms from
number theory allow arithmetic on encrypted data.
Homomorphic encryption allows an information aggregator not to be trusted.
That is, the aggregator could not easily violate individual patient privacy in a math-
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ematically provable sense. The scheme prevents rogue insiders from violating privacy
and prevents accidental leakage of private information. The tradeoff is that homomorphic encryption requires sophisticated computation on a modern computer, which
is feasible on commodity hardware for workloads common to medical telemetry.
The potential of computing on encrypted data has promising theoretical results,
especially after the recent findings of Gentry [63] that prove fully homomorphic encryption schemes can be implemented using lattices. This discovery suggests that the
research community may be close to extending the capabilities of this technique to
essentially allow arbitrary computations on encrypted data.

7.3.2

Access Model

The assumption is that direct caregivers need access to all of a patient’s medical data in order to perform proper treatment. Under this assumption, there is
an unrestricted data flow between patients and their direct caregivers. In such a
model, multiparty computation techniques can be applied to allow distinct caregivers
to compute collective answers to queries posed by clinical researchers and manufacturers (Figure 7.5).
For simplicity, it is also assumed that a patient does not have multiple caregivers
in this model. Multiple associations could lead to false aggregates due to duplication.
However, such a situation can be addressed by requesting that each patient has only
one caregiver that reports data on his behalf.
The queries required by researchers and manufacturers can be classified into the
following types:
1. Selective individual disclosure: Queries to obtain a list of records.
This type of query would present the problem of returning a set of records
that match a set of criteria from data distributed across the set of caregivers
{C1 , C2 , . . . Cn }. The result of such a query can be seen as a matrix, the rows of
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which are the union of the rows of the sub-matrices that each of the caregivers
returns to the query posted. For example, a query could request the age, gender
and number of critical events in a given month for all the patients that have an
ICD and that use a home monitor nationwide. Then each caregiver Ci would
return a matrix (query table) with three columns and as many rows as patients
are being treated by Ci . The final result to the query should be a union of all
these records. The result can be thought of as a matrix with the same three
columns and with as many rows as the total number of relevant records found
nationwide.
2. Queries to obtain aggregated disclosures.

This type of query would

present the problem of computing an aggregate function on data distributed
across the set of caregivers {C1 , C2 , . . . Ck } while preserving the privacy of the
data between any two different caregivers.
The main focus of this chapter is to design a system using homomorphic encryption
to address the queries of the second type (aggregation), which are posed when clinical
researchers and device manufacturers need to compute aggregates and other similar
statistical information. The objectives for obtaining data may differ between clinical
researchers and device manufacturers, and it is important to note that this model
requires that both researchers and manufacturers specify clearly and openly the kind
of information that they require.

7.3.3

Threat Model

The goal of HICCUPS is to prevent unnecessary disclosure of large collections
of medical telemetry. It is assumed that locations with transient access to plaintext
records (e.g., caregivers) are relatively small collections such that a compromise will
result in only localized disclosure of information rather than system-wide disclosure.
The threat model for HICCUPS considers both external and internal adversaries.
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For instance, an external hacker who gains unauthorized access to a machine should
cause at worst a localized disclosure of patient information. An external entity should
not be able to cause a catastrophic disclosure of the entire collection. Potential insiders include medical researchers and aggregators. When these players follow the
established protocol, it is expected that they will have access to aggregated information. However, if the players act maliciously they should not be able to compromise
the entire system, but at worst delay the availability of information. In this model,
caregivers are fully trusted by their corresponding patients. That is, caregivers are
not considered potential insiders but are potential targets of external adversaries.

7.3.4

Desired Properties

In order to answer queries for aggregated information, it is necessary to solve the
problem of computing aggregates from encrypted values using the public key Rp of
a researcher R by caregivers {C1 , C2 , . . . Ck }. Desirable properties for such a solution
include:
1. Anonymity of Data Provider. Given a set of ciphertexts

{EncRp (a1 ), EncRp (a2 ), . . . , EncRp (ak )},

provided by a set of entities {Cj }, the probability of determining that EncRp (ai ),
for a given i, was computed by Cj for some j should differ by a negligible quantity
from guessing this association.
2. Distributivity. It is important to emphasize that a proposed solution should
be implemented using a distributed model as opposed to a centralized model.
A centralized approach would give too much power to the holder and would
create a single point of failure. As discussed by Jefferson et al. [83] centralized
systems introduce several privacy risks in voting systems [84] for example.
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Figure 7.5. A researcher or manufacturer needs to compute an aggregate function
from data across various caregivers. The query can be handled by an aggregator
chosen among the caregivers that computes on encrypted data.

3. Semantic security. A final implementation of HICCUPS should be done
using an encryption system that is semantically secure to avoid chosen plaintext
attacks (§7.6).

7.3.5

Design

This section shows how having an encryption scheme with the homomorphic property may provide an answer to the problem of computing aggregate functions with
data that is distributed among various caregivers. Sample aggregation functions that
can be computed using the homomorphic property are presented (§7.4). The number
of functions that can be computed using this technique is dramatically extended if a
fully homomorphic encryption is used.
Unless stated otherwise, the existence of a public key infrastructure with a semantically secure homomorphic encryption scheme with key generation algorithm,
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Figure 7.6. The aggregator is chosen at random to eliminate the probability of
a compromised aggregator systematically leaking data. The rest of the caregivers
compute sub-aggregates, which can be combined by the aggregator to produce a
total aggregate for the manufacturers and researchers.

encryption algorithm, and decryption algorithm (Gen, Enc, Dec respectively) is assumed.
The model proposed here is one in which patients give all of their medical data to
their caregivers. In this model, various patients’ data clusters around caregivers. The
tasks of computing aggregates across caregivers in order to answer the questions of
manufacturers and researchers could then be thought of as a multiparty computation
(Figure 7.6).
Consider the problem of computing a publicly known aggregate function f for a
variable x with data distributed among a set of caregivers {C1 , C2 , . . . , Ck } from subaggregates a1 , a2 , ..., an , pre-computed by the caregivers Ci . That is, f (a1 , a2 , ..., an )
is the aggregate value needed for the publicly known function f . Aggregates can
be combined to compute functions such as sample mean, sample variance, maxima,
linear regression, and sample correlation (§7.4).
A global aggregate could be computed as follows:
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1. Request for an aggregate. A researcher R interested in computing a global
aggregate submits the request specifying one of the possible aggregate functions
P
f . For example, the function could be a simple aggregate sum f (xij ) = i,j xij ,
over a defined set of values xij distributed among all the set of participant
caregivers {Ci }.
2. Selection of an aggregator. All the caregivers run a distributed algorithm
to determine a random aggregator within the set of participant caregivers {Ci }.
At the end of this step, one of the participant caregivers is designated the
aggregator for the request. This aggregator is denoted A. Note that having a
fixed aggregator could lead to an attack in which the privacy guarantees could
be reduced to essentially those of handing over the sub-aggregates per caregiver
directly to the researcher R. This may be undesirable, for example, if a query
is asking for the age of the oldest patient in a group distributed nationwide. By
exposing sub-aggregates, the researcher would obtain not only the age, but also
potentially the name of the patient’s caregiver. The selection of an aggregator
randomly can be done using distributed techniques similar to those proposed
by Kapron et al. [88].
3. Computation of sub-aggregates. Each caregiver Ci receives the request
and computes its corresponding sub-aggregate ai and encrypts it first using the
public key of the researcher Rp , and then using the public key of the aggregator
Ap . The caregiver Ci can then use a bulletin board style protocol to share the
encrypted result EncAp (EncRp (ai )). Coming back to the example, the caregivers
P
P
would create the ai s such that i ai = i,j xij , but would not send the ai s
unencrypted.

4. Unwrapping. The caregiver A chosen to compute the aggregate obtains the
encrypted values {EncRp (ai )} by decrypting the first layer of
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EncAp (EncRp (ai )) for each i. This is needed to ensure that only the designed
aggregator A is able to compute the aggregate. A complimentary technique can
be used to ensure participation; for example, the outer wrap can be signed by
the corresponding caregiver.
5. Aggregation. The caregiver A computes
f ∗ (EncRp (ai )), where f ∗ can be obtained from f using the homomorphic property. Subsequently A destroys each individual EncRp (ai ). Implicitly, this assumes that the majority of the caregivers are honest. If that were not the
case, and the majority of the caregivers were willing to forward the individual
EncRp (ai ), then the probability of falling victim to an attack like the one in the
case of having a fixed aggregator could not be considered negligible. Also note
that the aggregator was not in the position to learn anything about the subaggregates from the other caregivers since the sub-aggregates were encrypted
using the researcher’s public key. In the example f ∗ corresponds to adding encrypted aggregates with the operation ⊕, while f corresponds to the addition
of plaintexts, thus f ∗ (EncRp (ai )) = ⊕i EncRp (ai ).
6. Handing over.

The aggregator A returns the encrypted aggregate value

EncRp (f (ai )) to the researcher R, which can be decrypted using its corresponding secret key Rs .
Note that in an alternative approach this aggregation could be done by encrypting
each of the values {EncRp (xi,j )} distributed among caregivers C1 , C2 , . . . , Ck , where xi,j
is a value known to Ci and j ranges from 1, . . . , ni the sample size in Ci . However, in
the case of computing aggregates for medical data nationwide this could potentially
involve transmitting millions of values to the aggregator A, instead of sending only
one sub-aggregate ai per caregiver. Thus, the proposed approach could potentially
avoid a large unnecessary overhead.
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7.4

Computing Aggregates through Counting Queries

Multiple aggregates can be combined to calculate common statistical functions, although there are some challenges in generalizing the examples below to complete solutions for privacy-preserving aggregation (§7.6.3). The ability to extend the techniques
described here will depend on whether a singly homomorphic encryption scheme or
a fully homomorphic scheme is used. That is, whether one or two operations (addition and/or multiplication) on ciphertexts with the homomorphic property may be
performed.
Consider a homomorphic encryption scheme that is IND-CPA secure with key
generation algorithm, encryption algorithm, and decryption algorithm (Gen, Enc, Dec
respectively) and with semigroups of plaintexts and ciphertexts M and C respectively.
That is, the homomorphic property is such that for m1 , m2 ∈ M and a pair of public
and secrete keys Ap , As

EncAp (m1 + m2 ) =p EncAp (m1 ) ⊕ EncAp (m2 )
where ⊕ is the corresponding operation to + on C and =p denotes indistinguishability
of distributions. An adversary would not be able to tell that EncAp (m1 + m2 ) and
EncAp (m1 ) ⊕ EncAp (m2 ) correspond to the same plaintext. However

DecAs (EncAp (m1 + m2 )) = DecAs (EncAp (m1 ) ⊕ EncAp (m2 )).

A randomly selected caregiver computes an aggregate such as the sample mean
and variance of a sample of values {xi,j } distributed among caregivers C1 , C2 , . . . , Ck ,
where xi,j is a value known to Ci and j ranges from 1, . . . , ni , the sample size in Ci .
This procedure does not require the actual knowledge of the values {xi,j }. Instead
the knowledge of appropriate encrypted sub-aggregate values suffices.
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In this case, the mean of xi,j over all Ci s is given by

x̄ =

Pk Pni
i=1

Pk

j=1

xi,j

ni

i=1

And the variance of the sample is given by

s2 =

Pk Pni
i=1

P ni

P
( k

xi,j )2

i=1
j=1
2
Pk
j=1 (xi,j ) −
i=1 ni
P
( ki=1 ni ) − 1

P i
Now, denote ai = nj=1
xi,j , and
P i
(xi,j )2 then the formulas can be rewritten as:
bi = nj=1
Pk

x̄ = Pki=1
i=1

and
s2 =

Pk

ai
ni

P
( k

a )2

i
Pi=1
k
i=1 bi −
i=1 ni
P
( ki=1 ni ) − 1

Thus, given the additive homomorphic scheme, researcher R can compute these
aggregates preserving privacy as follows: In order to compute aggregates such as the
mean and the variance, the aggregator A first collects the encrypted values of ai , bi , ni
(using the public key, Rp of the researcher R) from the caregivers. More explicitly,
if each of the Ci s provides EncRp (ai ), EncRp (bi ), and EncRp (ni ), then the aggregator
Lk
Lk
Lk
A computes a =
i=1 EncRp (ai ), b =
i=1 EncRp (bi ), and n =
i=1 EncRp (ni )

and sends these three values to researcher R. Finally, the researcher R, using the
corresponding secret key Rs , would simply compute:

x̄ =

DecRs (a)
DecRs (n)

since
k
M
i=1

Similarly,

k
X
EncRp (ai ) =p EncRp (
ai ).
i=1
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2

s =

DecRs (b) −

DecRs (a)
DecRs (n)

DecRs (n) − 1

.

These ideas can be extended to compute a linear regression y = β0 + β1 x and a
sample correlation rxy . The problem of estimating β0 , and β1 can be obtained from
P P 2 P P 2
P
the sums
x, x , y,
y , and
xy as follows:
P P
P
y · x − n · xy
P
β1 = P 2
( x) − n · ( x2 )

and

β0 =
and

rxy

P

P
P P
x · xy − y x2
P
( x)2 − n · x2

P P
xy − x y
=p P
.
P p P
P
n · x2 − ( x)2 n · y 2 − ( y)2
n·

P

It may also be useful to compute maxima or minima. The following shows how
to compute maxima; the computation of minima is completely analogous. While this
described method is not optimal, it serves to illustrate the feasibility of computing
such functions using aggregates.
In order to compute a global maximum for a variable among a set of caregivers
{Ci }, the problem must first be redefined in a convenient way. In particular, it will
be necessary to have an idea of the range (rmin , rmax ) and precision d for these values.
For example, if it were required to find the maximum temperature for all the patients
meeting certain conditions, one could specify the range to be between 35 and 48
degrees Celsius. Precision may need to be obtained up to one decimal place.
Given these two values, one can define a vector with l entries where l is equal to
the number of intervals of size d in the interval (rmax , rmin ), or simply l =
rmin , rmax ∈ Z. Then each of the entities in {Ci } can return a vector

vi = (EncRp (c0 ), . . . , EncRp (cj ), . . . , EncRp (cl−1 ))
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rmax −rmin
d

if

where cj = 1, if rmin + cj is the maximum value within the caregiver Ci ’s data, and
cj = 0 otherwise.
Adding the vectors {vi } across caregivers produces a vector v =

P

i

vi such that

the last non-zero entry of the decrypted vector DecRs (v) (decrypted entry by entry)
corresponds to the global maximum.
This approach would require the computation of l sum aggregations, and, therefore, the complexity of this algorithm increases linearly with the number of possible
values for the maximum. This complexity can be greatly reduced by using a typical
tree-like approach to determine if the maximum is on the left or on the right of a given
interval. That is, one can run this aggregation scheme with only two possible values
for the maximum, implementing it so that the participant caregivers return either
one or the other as being closer to the maximum. After one side has been chosen, the
algorithm would be used recursively on this selected subinterval to again determine
if the maximum is on the left or on the right side of the interval until the desired
precision has been achieved. This approach would require a logarithmic number of
sum aggregations on l, but there would be an overhead in the communication caused
by multiple protocol interactions.
Now consider a fully homomorphic encryption scheme that is IND-CPA secure
with key generation algorithm, encryption algorithm, and decryption algorithm (Gen, Enc, Dec
respectively) and with sets of plaintexts and ciphertexts M and C respectively with
ring structures. Then, the homomorphic properties are as follows: For m1 , m2 ∈ M
and a pair of public and secret keys Ap , As ,

EncAp (m1 + m2 ) =p EncAp (m1 ) ⊕ EncAp (m2 )
and
EncAp (m1 · m2 ) =p EncAp (m1 )
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EncAp (m2 ),

where (+, ·) are the operations in M and (⊕, ) are the corresponding operations on
C. =p denotes indistinguishability of distributions.
This structure dramatically increases the type of functions that can be computed.
In particular, one can see that matrix multiplication with encrypted data is easy
to compute. This would allow the computation of multiple regression models, for
example. The challenge, however, is to eliminate the need for communicating the
large matrices to an aggregator, and instead, think of subdividing the problem into
smaller problems that each of the caregivers can compute separately.

7.5

Defining Evaluation Metrics

This work is a preliminary attempt to learn the problems and limitations of employing homomorphic encryption techniques to aggregate medical telemetry. This
section argues for a reconsideration of the metrics for evaluating a solution to the
problem of privacy-preserving aggregation of medical telemetry.

7.5.1

The Case for Expressibility

In biomedical image analysis, processing a single fMRI brain image may take a few
hours or more if processing the image requires tasks such as manual skull stripping or
manual selection of areas of interest by an expert. Gathering the appropriate medical
data to perform research may involve contacting multiple institutions and having
different IT departments gather the data according to multiple parameters—a task
that may take days. Therefore, running time of homomorphic encryption likely should
not serve as the primary metric of quality given that instantaneous results are not
expected. If gathering medical telemetry for research purposes using homomorphic
techniques does not require days of processing, then computation time may not be
the only performance metric, or even an important one.
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Determining the extent to which a system like HICCUPS is useful should involve
measuring its expressibility. That is, if a system allows the computation of only one
type of aggregate, then the capability to express an aggregate problem is limited.
On the other hand, if a system allows the computation of most types of aggregates,
or even further, most types of functions on aggregates, this would mean that the
capability of expressing an aggregate problem is high.

7.5.2

The Case against Strict CPU Metrics

Future systems designed with purposes similar to HICUPPS should not solely be
evaluated with computational performance metrics. Note that the overhead added
by computing aggregates on encrypted data is minimal in comparison to other aspects such as communication costs. Compare the following scenarios for computing
aggregates on medical telemetry.
With the current infrastructure, researchers and manufacturers acquire statistical data by accessing patients’ medical data directly. This scenario requires that
all relevant data be gathered and aggregated under the management of one institution. Manufacturers query a patient frequently and collect all of the patients’ data.
Researchers must submit their requests to manufacturers or doctors to obtain the
statistical data—potentially taking months to access aggregated data.
An improvement to the above system would result from the distribution of the
workload among caregivers. A manufacturer or researcher submits a request for an
aggregate to a designated aggregator. This aggregator broadcasts the manufacturer’s
request to all of the caregivers. Each caregiver computes the sub-aggregate of his
patients’ medical data and sends back one single value to the aggregator. Finally,
the aggregator combines these sub-aggregates into one aggregate value that will be
returned to the manufacturer or researcher. The designated aggregator could be the
manufacturer itself, one of the caregivers, or an external entity.
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An estimate of the time that is required to compute an aggregate under this
scenario is made up of: the time needed to submit the request to the aggregator;
the time needed to broadcast the request to the caregivers; the time caregivers need
to compute the sub-aggregate value; the time needed to transmit and process the
data from all the caregivers; and finally, the time needed to compute and return the
aggregate value to the manufacturer or researcher. If caregivers work in parallel, then
the time required to compute the sub-aggregates can be assumed to be the maximum
time needed by any one caregiver.
In practical terms, the hypothetical performance of HICCUPS differs from the
distributed aggregation scenario mentioned above in that each sub-aggregate computed by the caregivers is encrypted using, first the researcher’s or manufacturer’s
public key and then using the aggregator’s public key. Additionally, the aggregator
would have to be chosen randomly for each request.
In order to estimate the computation overhead added by HICCUPS, it is possible
to compare the time overhead of this protocol to the second scenario. There are
essentially four pieces of overhead: the time that it takes to perform two encryptions
of a single value; the time that is needed by the aggregator to decrypt the first layer
of encryption; and the time that is needed to perform k operations on encrypted
data, where N is the number of caregivers. Operations on encrypted data include,
for example, additions on a group of elliptic curve points. The performance of HICCUPS can be estimated by calculating the encryption overhead and adding it to the
performance time of the distributed aggregation scenario above.
HICCUPS could be implemented using a variety of encryption schemes. For the
purposes of this argument, only two of the more commonly used encryption schemes
that have the homomorphic property are considered. These schemes are RSA and
ElGamal based on ECC.
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Using data provided by Gupta et al. [73], it is possible to estimate the time overhead of HICCUPS due to security. As Table 7.1 shows, a manufacturer or researcher
would need to tolerate only a delay on the order of 100 milliseconds in order to
protect the security and privacy of patients’ data. The addition operation is about
0.59 µseconds and 0.71 µseconds for ECC-160 and ECC-224 bits respectively [38].
Protocol
RSA-1024
Time Overhead 901.309 ms

ECC-160
380.66 ms

RSA-2048
5786.611 ms

ECC-224
527.431 ms

Table 7.1. Estimated overhead added by HICCUPS for performing a simple aggregation with 100 caregivers with 1000 records each. The table shows the overheads
using four different primitives: securely equivalent RSA-1024 and ECC-160, as well
as RSA-2048 and ECC-224.

7.6

Related Work

Related work on secure aggregation includes applications of homomorphic encryption to electronic voting and advances in understanding the theoretical limits of
homomorphic encryption.
7.6.1

Homomorphic Encryption Applications

Homomorphic encryption has been highly studied since its introduction by Rivest
et al. [128]. Their paper proposed the idea of being able to compute on encrypted
data without the need to decrypt. The desired property was to be able to construct
an encryption scheme such that you would obtain the same result by multiplying two
plaintexts and then encrypting the result, or, by first encrypting two plaintexts and
then multiplying their corresponding ciphertexts.
Castelluccia et al. have shown that it is possible to compute aggregates such
as averages, variances, and standard deviations in a scenario similar to the one described, using only a single homomorphic operation [30]. However, due to the resource constraints of sensor networks, their work uses symmetric key cryptography
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which imposes a different set of requirements than those in this chapter. For instance,
aggregation in sensor networks is hierarchical as opposed to the one-layer aggregator
in HICCUPS.
The research problem addressed by HICCUPS shares similar goals with electronic
voting designs. Both systems aim to protect user (patient vs. voter) privacy while providing aggregated result of the private data (statistical function vs. count). However,
the solutions for voting systems cannot be easily applied to the telemetry systems
because of two major differences in the problems: (1) The constraints of voting systems (voter privacy and result verifiability) are believed to be self-contradictory. This
is not the case in telemetry systems. (2) While the voting system requires only one
fixed query (counting), it is not feasible to require medical researchers to completely
fix their queries. Homomorphic encryption schemes have been successfully applied to
voting [117]. However, HICCUPS ’ desired properties and conditions pose different
problems. For example, the problem of generating ballots, aggregating votes individually and allowing individual verifications may impose a non-negligible overhead for
computing queries on a regular basis. Also, homomorphic encryption has been used
in the implementation of universal re-encryption for mixnets [70].
There have been attempts to provide privacy-preserving systems for sharing medical data. Au and Croll propose a privacy-preserving centralized e-health system to
provide access to health record data from medical databases distributed across various clinics and hospitals [13]. However, Jefferson et al. [83] exposed some of the
privacy risks introduced by a centralized system, such as the voting system studied in
their work [84]. Furthermore, Sahai suggested that the existence of an efficient and
practical semantically secure public key encryption scheme that is also algebraically
homomorphic, would enable minimally interactive distributed data-mining and secure
computation [131].
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7.6.2

Theoretical Advancements

Goldwasser and Micali introduced the term semantic security when they were
defining the first probabilistic cryptosystem to formalize the fact that deterministic cryptosystems are not secure against chosen ciphertext attacks [66]. That is, if
a deterministic encryption scheme is used, then it is possible that an eavesdropper
observing several messages may be able to detect ciphertexts coming from identical
messages. This first probabilistic system, proposed by Goldwasser and Micali [67]
was a homomorphic encryption system that, while impractical, served as the basis
for many other homomorphic encryption systems. This implies that the highest security level cannot be reached by a deterministic homomorphic cryptosystem. Even
further, Boneh and Lipton showed that any deterministic algebraically homomorphic
cryptosystem can be broken in sub-exponential time [22].
Homomorphic encryption does not provide the nonmalleability security requirement. For a cryptosystem to be nonmalleable it is necessary that given a ciphertext
c = E(m), it should be hard for an adversary to create a ciphertext c0 = E(m0 ) such
that a relationship between m0 and m can be established. It is clear that homomorphic
encryption schemes do not satisfy this property since a relationship between m0 and
m would be given by the homomorphic property [44, 45]. Bellare et al. [17] showed
that if a cryptosystem does not provide the nonmalleability security requirement, then
chosen plaintext indistinguishability IND-CPA is the strongest requirement that may
be satisfied by it. In fact, there are homomorphic encryption schemes that satisfy
IND-CPA, for example Elgamal [54] and Pallier [117] cryptosystems.
The question of the existence of a fully homomorphic cryptosystem, i.e. one that
commutes with both addition and multiplication efficiently, was an open problem
until recently. Craig Gentry proved that it is possible to create a fully homomorphic
encryption using lattices [63]. The work of Boneh et al. [21] presents a homomorphic
encryption scheme that allows the evaluation of 2-DNF formulas on encrypted boolean
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variables. The defined encryption function supports addition and one multiplication.
The same technique can be used in this chapter to enhance the system capabilities
for researchers and manufacturers. The assumption of having honest majority of
caregivers made in this chapter can be relaxed by applying the techniques from the
work of Ishai et al. [81]. Their work proposes several solutions to perform secure
arithmetic computation with no honest majority.

7.6.3

Achieving Differential Privacy with Adequate Utility

A challenge in computing distributed counting queries is that when computing
exact answers, it is possible to infer an individual entry by either using a collection
of queries or by using external knowledge. For example, consider the case when an
P
analyst requests an answer to the computation of a sum ni=1 ai , where ai is the
entry associated to individual i. Now, if somehow the analyst is able to request the
Pn
P
computation ( k−1
i=k+1 ai ), i.e. because a SELECT query would exclude
i=1 ai ) + (

individual k, then the analyst would be able to infer the value ak . Differential privacy
gives a formal definition that prevents an adversary from manipulating a system in
this way.
Because achieving differential privacy requires that an answer has a small distortion, one of the main challenges is to ensure that systems that provide differential
privacy also provide good answers; that is, answers that are very close to an exact
answer. Dinur et al. [43] provide bounds for the minimum amount of noise that must
be added in statistical databases in order to achieve differential privacy. Also, Gupta
et al. [72] provide a bound on the minimum number of statistical queries that are
needed to answer all queries in a given class. However, the problem is more complicated in practice because analyses can be decomposed into simple queries in a variety
of ways. As a result, the final answer to an analysis that is computed with a set of
simpler queries, each answered providing differential privacy, may have different util-
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ity than the same analysis computed using a different set of simpler queries. In other
words: “it depends on how you ask.” The issue of decomposing a complex analysis
into the best set of queries to achieve maximum utility when queries are answered via
a system that provides differential privacy is an open problem.

7.7

Conclusion

This chapter proposes an alternative model for collecting medical telemetry from
medical devices to allow privacy-preserving analyses across institutions. This approach may be used for monitoring for malfunctions and enabling multi-institutional
research. This chapter also argues that given the time-line of medical studies, systems to perform multi-institutional analyses should be evaluated on the basis of the
usefulness of the information that can be learned and the privacy that they provide
rather than the computational overhead that may be incurred.
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CHAPTER 8
FUTURE WORK

Recent theoretical advancements have provided robust definitions for characterizing privacy. There is still more work needed to determine how to attain privacy with
high utility. The notion of utility is to some extent application dependent; for example, in the context of statistical databases, Rastogi et al. [124] consider a definition
of utility that relates to the accuracy of computing counting queries. However, there
is ongoing research towards quantifying utility in a more general way, independent
of the application. For instance, Sankar et al. [136] study the problem of quantifying the privacy-utility tradeoff using rate distortion theory. Kasiviswanathan, et al.
address the question of identifying what can be privately learned [90]. Thus, there
are a number of rich intellectual problems whose solutions would improve the current
practice of data collection and analysis.
Additional problems may be of particular interest for systems that are deployed
more ubiquitously while still relying on constrained devices. For example, an interesting issue is computing privacy preserving aggregates in the presence of high churning
rates. In the case of CRFIDs, this could involve calculating aggregates when most
tags do not participate in a given aggregation. This would allow, for instance, a
transportation authority to compute an aggregate query involving only the transportation tokens currently present on a given bus. Chan et al.[33] propose a solution
to perform privacy-preserving aggregation with fault tolerance to address the issue
of aggregation with nodes that occasionally join and leave. Not only is this solution
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somewhat impractical on CRFIDS, but it also assumes that a majority of the tags
will be present in any given aggregation.
Another compelling question relates to determining the extent to which partial
computations can be off-loaded from constrained devices to more powerful computing
systems without leaking potentially private data. Lauter et al. [111] show promising
results with regards to the efficient implementation of fully homomorphic encryption
from ring-LWE. More work is needed to explore what such techniques would make
possible in the near future on highly constrained devices. For example, if the computation of certain functions could be privately outsourced from constrained devices to
more powerful systems, it may be possible to better design distributed systems that
limit data leakage while enabling high computational workloads.
At a lower level, there is still more research needed to improve general system support for some particularly constrained devices. In the case of CRFIDs there is room
for designing operating systems, distributed or otherwise, that are adequate in highly
transient power conditions. It is important to continue to improve application support for these devices, particularly to ensure that they operate securely. Future work
could also affect other related areas in computer systems. Personal devices such as
smart phones, tablet computers, or other handheld devices could potentially improve
the ways in which they collect and aggregate data across individuals. Developments
in distributed techniques to provide privacy in aggregations offer an alternative model
in which individuals do not have to trust providers with their data.

8.1

Privacy-Preserving Dynamic Queries for Smart Metering

Further work is needed on privacy-preserving smart meters to enable flexible
queries. It is possible to use zero-knowledge proofs to compute sophisticated billing
and other aggregates while providing privacy. However, this approach is limited in
its ability to offer flexibility to request different aggregate functions over time. An

116

electric utility company may be interested in knowing: How many people in a given
neighborhood charge an electric car during the day? or How many people in a given
neighborhood have underperforming appliances? These questions may be answered in
a privacy-preserving manner using an approach similar to that discussed in Chapter 6.
A challenge is limiting the knowledge that any given analyst may obtain. A query
preprocessor needs to implement a policy that applies privacy parameters according
to the history of queries that a given analyst has requested. Such a technique has
been applied in systems such as GUPT [104]. A related issue may be in implementing
a system that allows individuals to have an input in deciding the extent to which they
would like to participate in such aggregates. For example, some individuals may opt
to enroll in a benefit program where they are required to participate often in this
kind of query. Others may choose to decline all participation.

8.2

Smart Phones and Other Personal Data Relays

Using networking stacks such as the one described in Chapter 5, smart phones
could take on the role of data relays, obtaining data from CRFIDs that are either
attached to a person or a place. A key aspect of providing privacy within the model
of this dissertation is that the raw data remains with the individual; both the individual and the service provider can benefit from the data without the service provider
having direct access to them. Thus, in this case, a highly constrained device, such
as a medical device, may communicate its data to a smart phone, which would then
respond to a query for an aggregation. Also, this smart phone would potentially obtain an aggregate from the medical implants of other individuals. In this way, smart
phones could take on the role of personal systems that actually interface with service
providers and devices from different individuals. Therefore, the techniques discussed
in this dissertation may be further extended by the additional capabilities of smart
phones. Note that smart phones are members of a more general class of data relays.
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For example, Chapter 4 suggests that in the near future each household will have
small devices that can control all appliances in the home, e.g. lighting, temperature, vehicle charging, washing appliances, etc. This kind of device would also be a
candidate for mediating aggregation between service providers and other individuals.
Thus, it is possible that the work in this dissertation will motivate further research
with the purpose of developing techniques that allow an individual’s data to stay
with him or her as much as possible to protect location data, participation in social
networks, preferences about places, movies, books, etc.

8.3

Transportation Payments Using CRFIDs

E-cash protocols are related to the techniques discussed in Chapter 4. These protocols typically involve three parties: banks, users, and merchants and are meant
to enable financial transactions that provide privacy guarantees to users and security guarantees to banks and merchants. Thus, users can be guaranteed anonymity
or unlinkability in transactions. Banks and merchants would like to attain strong
guarantees that ensure that transactions are properly backed by real money.
Many of the cryptographic blocks required for e-cash schemes share commonalities
with the cryptographic blocks used in the billing protocol in Chapter 4, such as
cryptographic commitments, CL-signatures and ZKPs. However, the protocols differ
slightly. Typically, users have accounts with banks and withdraw e-coins, which can
be given to merchants in exchange for goods or services. Then merchants, who also
have accounts with banks, can deposit the obtained e-coins to obtain financial credit
for the coins.
An important feature of e-cash is that transactions between users and merchants
may happen off-line. That is, e-coins can be spent without requiring that merchants
communicate to the bank to verify the validity of the e-coins. E-cash protocols instead
discourage double spending by ensuring that when a user double spends an e-coin, he
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or she reveals his or her identity in the process. Thus, when a user creates an account
with a bank, the bank knows the identity of the user but not how he or she spends
e-coins.
The work in this dissertation may serve as a foundation for using CRFIDs to
implement various payment tokens. Hinterwälder et al.

[77] have explored the

possibility of implementing an e-cash scheme using a UMass Moo. Hinterwälder et
al. do not discuss the networking aspects of the protocol. The networking stack for
CRFIDs discussed in this dissertation may be complementary to the implementation
of an e-cash scheme that could be used in transportation systems.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS

The work in this dissertation gives evidence to support the thesis that a model
for data collection in which individuals keep most of their data and provide only
aggregates to service providers is practical in applications that rely on low-cost or
ultra-low-power microcontrollers. This dissertation shows that the current model
of relying on a trusted data aggregator poses privacy concerns for individuals, in
particular in the case of smart metering. This application is only one example of
the many data collection systems that are becoming more prevalent. Economic and
technological trends suggest that the issue of creating privacy-aware solutions that can
be implemented on constrained devices will continue to grow in importance because
data collection mechanisms will rely more and more on constrained devices. There
are systems that need to be implemented with low-cost devices, and new systems
may also benefit from emerging energy harvesting technologies that allow for longterm and low-maintenance deployments. This dissertation also discusses limitations
and challenges that remain open—either related to techniques for achieving privacy
with high utility or regarding improving the practicality of implementations using
constrained systems.
The hope is that this work motivates the development of techniques that place
individuals in control of their own private data. The overall vision of this dissertation
is to contribute to the goal of providing privacy to individuals, which is ultimately
a right that should be preserved not despite achievements in computer science, but
because of them.
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